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FOREVlORD 
We hear so often at the present time about intuitionism and existen-
tialism in philosophy in condemnation of Scholasticism, as though the 
latter were but a remnant of the ossified metaphysics of the Middle Ages, 
of no value to humanity of our time. This means that men do not know the 
true Scholasticism - the Scholasticism built on the teachings of st. Thomas. 
The schoolmen themselves brought discredit on the classic Scholas-
ticism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because they did not grasp 
the true meaning of the teachings of the Angelic doctor and, consequently, 
instead of trying to see and promote the scientific movement iri the spirit 
of his doctrine, they not only stood aloof from it but actually opposed it 
as something contrary to his teachings. This was a crime of the first order 
not only against St. Thomas and his teachings, but also against Christ t s 
Church and humanity in general, since thereby they alienated from Christ 
and His Church the best scientific and philosophic minds who, thereafter, 
viewed the Church, Scholasticism and its authors and representatives as the 
enemies of science and every human progress, and, consequently, labored with 
might and main for the alienation of the rest of humanity from those 
sources of truth - the Church, Scholasticism, Catholic teachings. 
TOday, the schoolrnen should try to show men that true intuitionism and 
existentialism is found only in the philosophy of st. Thomas, who views man 
in his true nature, in the substantial union between his body and spir.it 
I 
and consequently, in the light of the principle that nothing passes into 
his soul except from the outside world and through his senses in the light 
of the principle of contradiction, whereby the intellect apprehends being 
and rejects non-beipg. Thomistic intuitions have tremendous potencies for 
good in every field of human endeavor, in every walk of human life, from 
birth to death and, therefore, should be explored to the utmost. 
Our own endeavors in this direction will be less than a tiniest drop 
in the immense ocean or, rather, nothing at all. Nevertheless, we have 
the good will and we hope and pray that it will be counted as an incentive 
to someone else to do more and better. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
• 
Man hungers and thirsts for truth. The history of philosophy plainly 
tells us so. From the time of Thaies until now, there has been the philoso-
pher's quest of wisdom. From the time of Adam until now there has been 
man's quest of truth and knowledge in all the fields of his endeavors. 
Truth is the proper object of man's mind. Truth is the only door into the 
domain of goodness, love, beauty, righteousness, virtue, of everything that 
is truly great, noble, and sacred. For what is truth for the intellect is 
goodness, love, and everything else for the will since the same ~ or 
being, in relation to the intellect, is truth, and in relation to the will 
is goodness. Man can and should come to the possession of truth and then 
live and become perfect by it and impart it to others for the glory of God 
and the good and perfection of mankind. Alas' More often than not, man 
misses the path leading to truth and consequently the road leading to good-
ness, love, unity, hannony and progress. Man, without truth in his mind, 
without goodness in his heart, 'Without intellectual, moral am spiritual 
perfections in his very being, is a monster and creates monstrosities in 
his works - in those of the arts, of literature, of musiC, and of philos-
ophy, as well as in the SOCial, moral, economic, political and religious 
order of things. 
The problem of intuition is that of epistemology or the theory of know-
ledge. How great and important this problem is, anyone can easily under-
1 
2 
stand if he bears in mind that on the theory of knowledge depend different 
systems of philosophy. Materialism, subjectivism, idealism, and 111 the 
rest of ~ in the domain of this wisdom have arisen, in the first place, 
from wrong theories of cognition. If one philosopher lays down, as Csbanie 
(1757-1808), a principle that thought is a secretion of the brain then, his 
whole philosophic system will be purely materialistic. And if another 
philosopher, like Kant (1724-1804), postulates that all our knowledge is 
modified by the innate ~ priori forms, then his philosophy will be that of 
subjectivism. From this one can easily perceive the importance and the 
greatness of the problem of intuition in the field of philosophy. Whole 
systems of philosophy may be built on it, either for the good or the down-
fall of mankind. In fact, whole systems of philosophy have been built on 
intuition and have already exercised tremendous influence on mankind, either 
for good or for evil according as the intuition was ri ghtly or wrongly 
understood in the theory of knowledge. 
Among the Greek philosophers Plato (4Zl-347) was the first one to study 
seriously the problem of knowledge. Hedged in between two contradictory 
systems" that of Parmenides (born about 540 B.C.), who upheld only being 
and rejected all becoming, and that of Heraclitus (born about 530 B.C.) for 
whom, on the contrar.y, there was only change in the world, Plato did much 
pioneering thinking for himself. 
Plato did not reject entirely the teaching of Par.menides or that of 
Heraclitus. He beheld partial truths in both of them. If one follows 
hrmanides as he stands, then one is forced, Plato rightly believed, to 
admit that there is o-nly the absolute in all things. But this is not true 
since the universe manifests movement and change everywhere. On the other 
:3 
band, if one fully agrees with Heraclitus, then he is obliged, Plato 
thought again, to admit that things in the world are only so manrrelations 
or relative phenomena. But neither is this true since a thing relative by 
its very nature implies a thing absolute from which it takes its rise. So 
there must be in the universe both things absolute and things relative. In 
other words, Parmenides and Heraclitus must be modified and combined to 
complete each other. 
But then again, Plato was of the opinion that we can in no way find in 
this visible world the foundation for philosophic knowledge of truth. The 
knowledge in question must be universal and based on certitude. This means 
that our scientific knowledge must be absolute and, consequently, have for 
its object an absolute truth. However, Plato admits only a relative knowl-
edge of things visible outside of us. He proves this relativity by the 
following examples If I put my hand half frozen in a bitter cold into l~­
warm water, I will pronounce the water hot, but if coming from a hot bath I 
put my hand into the same ki.nd of water, I will find it cold. Hence, the 
same lukawarmwater is cold and hot according to physical, biological or 
psychological state of the person using it.l 
A.ccordingly, what is true and good and beautiful to one man may be 
untrue and evil and ugly to another, since the opinions of men are bound to 
be contradictory. But true lmowledge cannot be contradictory, else the 
collapse of the whole order of truth is inevitable. Where, then, is the 
way out of this state of relativity, contradiction and absurdity? Plato 
1 
Joad, E. M., The Great Philosophers, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 
New York, pp. 5-2:>. 
! 2 4 
found the solution of the problem in the world of Forms or Ideas. 
To unde»stand what Plato meant by a Form (it is better to use the word 
-Form since the word Idea (Greek £ i J(;S) may be misleading since it is 
commonly used to signify an event in the mind, whereas Plato meant by his 
world of Ideas something outside the mind)3 let us consider the concept of 
whiteness. To be sure, whiteness is not the same thing as a white thing, 
such as snovr, milk, sugar, and the like. , Supposing we add all these things 
together, will the result thereof give us whiteness? No, for whiteness 
must transcend all white objects and be outside of them. Hence, white 
objects can never be Whiteness itself. This is clear. The result cannot 
be greater than its cause. The sum total of white objects is the result of 
so many single and particular things of this kind. 
What then is whiteness? For us, of course, it is an abstract idea 
existing in the mind or an abstraction of an abstraction, which means an 
essence minus its subject. For Plato, however, whiteness stood for an ab-
solute reality outside of the mind and "somewhere" in the world of Ideas or 
realities beyond this visible world of ours. For Plato what we call ideas, 
abstract or concrete, universal or singular, would be only so many opinions 
in no way connected with the absolute realities. If all minds ceased to be, 
then there would be no ideas in our connotation for Plato, but his Ideas or 
Forms are independent of any mind and are eternal, immutable, perfect and 
existing apart from the phenomena which we behold in the world. Plato 
2 Cf. T.imaeus for the full exposition of Plato's physics and of knovrledge 
regarding the phySical world. 
3 ~e Works of Plato,) "Phaedrus lf salec. and ed. by Irvin Edman. 
" 
describes his Form or Idea in the following manner, 
"Now ot the heaven which is above the heavens no earthly poet 
has ever sung or ever will sing in a worthy manner. But I IIDlst 
tell for I am bound to speak truly when speaking of the truth. 
The colorless and formless and intangible essence is visible 
to the mind, which is the only lord of the soul. Circling 
around this in the region above the heavens is the place of 
true knowledge." 4 
; 
The Form or Idea of beauty is described as "beauty only, absol~teJseparate, 
simple, and everlasting.u5 ·Similarly, Plato would no doubt describe for us 
any ideas, such as the idea of virtue, of justice, or again that of man, of 
animal, or anything else. 
Nevertheless, the physical world in 'Which we live and the world of 
Forms or Ideas in which the gods and the souls of the blessed live and con-
template, have something in common. It is the contact of the lower with 
the higher, of the phenomenon with the Idea by means of participation. The 
concrete good, such as a man, a horse, a cow, or a plant in the concrete 
world, partakes of the man-in-himself, of the horse-in-itself, of the 
animal-in-itself, of the plant-in-itself in the world of Ideas.6 Plato also 
I I 
explains this participa~ion by means of imitation (/L1/&461s ), holding 
the Idea as the prototype (paradeigmata) and the phenomenon as an ectype 
J'r 7 ( t l. (,) w A K) or a copy thereof. 
But how does Plato coma to the scientific and philosophic cognition of 
things in the world of Forms or Ideas? It is not, as we already know, by 
way of the concrete order of things. Whence then can this knowledge come? 
4 Phaedrus, Ope cit., p. 247. 
5 The Works of Plato, OPe cit., "The Banquet", p. 210. 
6 Cf. ll.etaphysics, Aristotle, I, 6, 9,S7p, 9. 
parmenides, p. 1320. 
7 Ibid.) 
-
Since Plato claims to possess the knowledge of the world of Forms or Ideas 
and since this knowledge cannot, according to him, come to us fro~ the 
world of phenomena, the only way which we can have the knowledge of the 
!!¢-versals, !. parte rei, is by means of the innate ideas. Plato believed 
that the human soul existed long before the human body. In the Phaedrus 
he sets forth this doctrine under the form. of an allegory. S The souls 
6 
before their imprisonment in the body lived an incorporeal and blessed life 
among the gods in the world of Ideas. The souls enjoyed in that region the 
vision of truth. Their favorite pastime consisted in riding in a chariot 
drawn by two steeds. One of tha steeds waft restive and ungovernable. The 
souls could not control it. Confusion was the result in their ranks. In 
the consequent tumult, the wings of m~ ware injured and they fall into 
ever lower regions until they finally reached the earth, the region of 
material substances 'Where they were united with the corporeal beings -
human bodies. The meaning of the llij'th seems to be that the soul in its 
incorporeal state had committed some grevious offense for which it was 
punished by imprisonment in the body. By coming in contact with the body 
the soul forgot all its previous knowledge. Hence, Plato everywhere speaks 
of its union with the body not as an advantage but as an evil. He calls 
the body the grave in which the soul is shut in as in a corpse. He calls it 
a prison in lrlrl.ch the soul is confined like a captive. He calls it a heavy 
chain which binds the soul and hinders its free expansion of energy and its 
activity. Hence the sooner the soul is released from the body, the better 
8 The Works of Plato, OPe cit. 
7 
it is for it •. The body is its unnatural abode. In the Phaedrus Plato 
describes the soul as pre-existing before the terrestrial life of «Jan and in 
the Timaeus as tied to the body with all the results consequent on this 
nunfortunate" union.9 
Plato is an extreme realist. For him the ideas in man's mind exist now 
as they did exist when he was in the heavenly regions. Ideas exist in the 
mind as they do in the world of Forms. The soul comes into this neeting 
'WOrld with the iriiorm ideas derived from the stable world of Forms. The 
relation between the neeting world and the forgotten data about the stable 
world in man's mind is this. The objects of sense cognition in this 'World 
become so many occasions for the mind of reawakening the dormant cognition 
in it of the Forms or Ideas somewhere beyond the heavenly spheres. Knowl-
edge for Plato is nothing else than the revival of the dormant and the for-
gotten in the mind. It is not the analyzing of the subject and the 
predicate, nor comparing them, nor finally joining them with the copula, 
est, nor separating them by the B:2!! m. No, it is nothing of the kind. It 
is simply the mind's seeing things YB2. intuitu, at once and immediately, on 
the occasion of the sentient perception and cognition. This Platonic method 
of lmowing things has been portrayed by the passage already quoted from the 
Phaedrus, "Now of the heaven which is above the heavens no earthly poet has 
ever sung or ever will sing in a wort~ manner, etc." 10 
The colorless and formless and intangible essences become visible to 
the mind as soon as its dormant cognition is reawakened by that of the 
9 Phaadrus, 246 ff. 
~41D 
10 ~~.Works of Plato, op. cit. 
S 
sentient objects. The world of Forms or Ideas we reach not by sense knowl-
edge but by means of intuitive contemplation. Again, all knowledge is re-
collection. Plato hardly ever speaks of the Idea in the singular but 
almOst always of the Ideas or Forms in the plural. For Plato there are 
three worlds - the world of concrete phenomena, that of our concepts, and 
that of Ideas. The relation between the world and that of concepts lies in 
the fact that the formar, that is, the world of concepts, is the faint re-
flection of the latter - that is, of the world of Ideas. To ever,y concept 
in the mind there corresponds an Idea among the hypostatized Universals or 
Ideas belonging to the realm of true being and unchanging reality. 11 Now, 
the world of phenomena is the world of sense perception, the realm of 
change, IJDJl.tiplicity, imperfection and, consequently, the world of partial 
not-being. This world of phenomena presents a striking contrast to the 
world of Forms or Ideas in the realm of hypostatized and viewless perfect-
ions above it. Nevertheless, there is something common between the two 
worlds - the world of phenomena partakes in the world of Ideas or Fbrms. 
By its ver,y position the world of phenomena performs for us the function of 
recalling in our mind what our soul has forgotten about the world of Ideas. 
The world of phenomena reawakens the dormant wisdom. Such is Plato's in-
tuition. It introduces man into the world of Ideas or Forms so that he may 
be united with the highest Good. Further, the role of Plato's intuition is 
to enable one to view the eternal and changeless hypostatized archetypes 
and to build on them science and philosophy. Again, the role of Plato's 
11 Republic, Bk V, 475 C-D. 
9 
intuition is to furnish the universal principles for science and wisdom. 
After Plato comes Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) to study and investigate the 
problems of epistemology. First of all, Aristotle's conception of the sOul ... 
entirely differs from that of Plato. He did not consider it as pre-exist-
ent sonswhere beyond the sides and then coming to be imprisoned in the body 
in punishloont for some transgression.lbut as a natural principle of speci-
fication, of being and of operation. So he defined it as the first 
12 entelec~ ~ ~ pPYsical body havins !!!!. potentially. By this conception 
of the soul and, consequently, of the body and then of the whole of man, 
Aristotle relegated Plato's theory of knowledge to the domain of poetry and 
fairy tales. Man's body is not a prison for his soul but the material 
element with which the rational. soul substantially uni tea to form with it 
one human compound, the person, and to be therein the principle of operation. 
However, in this human compound it is not the soul alone but the whole 
compound that acts and suffers the activity from the outside world. Man's 
soul as the first entelechy of his body haa no pre-existent and innate ideas, 
but must receive all its ideas from the outside through the senses. Hence 
Aristotle does not, like Plato, begin with the Idea but with the data of 
experience, the empirical, the actual, and thence rises by means of 
abstraction to universal ideas, ultimate reasons of things. He does not 
proceed synthetically and progressively like Plato, but for the most part 
analytically and regressively. Wherefore Aristotle's method is not of the 
! priori or deductive kind, but it is mostly a posteriori or inductive. 
12 ~ Anima, 11, c. 1. 
10 
For Aristotle there is first of all, analysis and then synthesis. Before 
one can 1mow a whole he has to know its parts. This is the very -trait of 
the human mind. It is the analytico-synthetic trait. Our intellective 
knowledge is first abstractive and then unitive. In this life we cannot do 
otherwise. This is our very nature. 13 
flHence his (Aristotle's) deliberate examination of facts, 
phenomena, circumstances, and possibilities as a means of rising 
to universal truths; hence his marked predilection for physical 
science, for nature is that which is nearest to us, and most 
actual in our experience; hence, too, his tendency to push 
scientific investigation in every direction for in his mind all 
facts have equal claims to consideration. This tendency led 
him to become the founder of sciences which were either unknown 
till his time or had previously received little attention, such 
as Logic, Natural History, Jus NatUrae. fI 14 
If analysis is the predominant feature in Aristotle's theory of 
cognition, is there in him any room left for intuition, that is, for 
immediate and simple views of thinga~ Indeed there is. He teaches that the 
immanence of the essence or the noumenon is in the phenomenon. 15 But 
before the intellect can separate the essence or the noumenon from the 
phenomenon, the latter acts directly on the senses. Individual things are 
called by Aristotle "first substances," and universal notions or ideas, 
16 
"second sub~tances." In the first substances lies the source of sentient 
intuitions and at the same time potential material for the second 
substances. In.the first substances and sentient intuitions arising from 
them lies also the source of Aristotelian intellectual intuitions regarding 
13 Analytica Posteriora. I, 13, B 1. 
14 stockl, Albert, Handbook of the History of Philosophy, Longmans Green Co., 
New York, 1911, Vol. 1, p. 96. 
15 Metaphysics, XIII, 0, 1086, 2-7. 
16 categ., S. 
11 
the first principles - those of Contradiction and of Excluded Third or 
• 
Middle. "Of the affirmation and the negation of the same thing the one is 
17 false, the other true." "Between the two terms of a contradiction there 
is no mean; it is necessary either to affirm or deny every predicate of 
every subject .I~ 18 In the metaphysical or ontological form the principal of 
contradiction (that is, as applied to being itself) is stated thus: liThe 
same thing cannot at the same time and in the same respect belong and not 
belong to the same thing." 19 On the metaphysical or ontological form of 
the principle of contradiction depends the validity of the logical form of 
the same principle. Again of the principle in this form Aristotle asserts, 
no proof is possible but only a subjective conviction that no one can deny 
it in thought. And this is, of course, an intellectual intuition pure and 
simple, but with its foundation in the concrete order of things and in the 
sentient intuitions. The individual substance alone has SUbstantial 
) I 
existence ( "tJ V- I "'" ), and the universal being is immanent in it in 
, . 
potency. 20 Hence it is also there in the first (0 () {if)'.) or substance 
that immanently remain the first principles concerning which there finally 
arises in the mind by abstraction from sentient intuitions the habit of 
the first principles. Such is the Aristotelian form of intuitionl Aristotle 
thereby solved the great epistemological problem on the most fundamental 
ground. 
17 De Cat., e., 10. 
18 Metaphysics. OPe cit., IV, 7. 
19 ~ 3. 
20 Ibid, 1, 3 et ale 
12 
However, with the advent of Christianity it was not Aristotle's 
• philosophy but the philosophy of Plato that was studied b.Y Christian 
philosophers. The so-called Ante-Nicene Fathers, like Justin Martyr 
(100-160), A the nagoras (died about 180), Ta tian and Theophilus (both 
belonging to the end of the second century), Irenaeus (140-202), Hippolitus 
(first half of the third century), Clement of Alexandria (died about 120 
A.D.), Origen (185-254), and then the so-called Post Nicene Fathers, like 
Athanasius of Alexandria (died 373), Gregory of N,yssa (331-394), Basil 
(died 379), and Gregory Nazianzen (born 330), Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagi te, Maxinru.s Confessor (580-662) were all in one way or another 
Platonists. Aristotle was for them too materialistiC, too earthly, but 
Plato sublime and di vinelike. Hence they preferred his philosophy to that 
of Aristotle. Accordingly, they modelled their epistemology on that of 
Plato introducing into it the necessar,y modifications required b.Y Christian 
religion. Thus, Justin Martyr says that whatever of truth is to be found 
in the works of the Greek philosophers and poets, and elsewhere nru.st be 
ascribed to the workings of the divine Logos present among all men in the 
germ (logos spermaticos) while in Christ truth appeared in its complete 
fullness. (1. Apol. V, 4; XLVI; II. Apol. VEl, XIII, 5,6.) 
But the greatest of all Platonists was Augustine (353-430), a 
philosopher and theologian in the Western Church. For him Plato was the 
Philosopher, just as Aristotle became the philosopher for st. Thomas Aquinas 
eight centuries later. Here are some examples of his Platonic intuition-
ism. The Platonic doctrine of Ideas can be consonant with ChriBtianity, 
says Augustjne, if we regard the Ideas as situated in the mind of God. 21 
21 De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, Q. 46, 2; Latin 40,30. 
13 
The spiritual Creature which is the intellectual or rational soul is 
• 
unformed unless it be turned toward the iDmlutable Light of Divine Wisdom, 
the Word of God. Its wise and happy life as an angel or human soul lies in 
this conformation to the Supreme Wisdom. 22 The effect of Divine illumi-
nation is not only epistemological but is also ontological. By the influence 
of Divine Light man's soul is not only enabled to know truly but it is 
brought b,y this action of spiritual conformation to a more perfect 
e.xistence. Z3 Again consider the Augustinian levels (hierarchies) of 
reality. The lowest kind of nature is that which is nmtable in both space 
and time; this is the nature of bodies. The second kind of nature on a 
higher metaphysical plane is that which is not mutable in regard to place 
but which does change in time; this is the level on which the soul exists. 
The highest nature is immutable both in place and time; this is God. This 
is the Augustinian geography of being. The human soul residing on the 
middle plane may look down to the things on the lowest level b,y means of 
external senses and may consider these things rationally b,y means of the 
function called inferior reason. Or the soul may look up to the highest 
reality and consider it by means of the superior reason. Now on the highest 
level in the Wisdom of God there are the immutable, eternal reasons or 
causes. 24 On the middle level abides, as mentioned above, ratio hominis, 
that is the rational soul of man. On the lowest level are found the 
,rationes seminales, the seed-like principles of corporeal things which wait 
22 De Genesi ad Litteram, I, 5, 10-11. 
23 Ibid.) 
24 De Genesi ad Litteram, I, 9, 17. 
- 14 
for a favorable opportunity to grow. 25 In all this St. Augustine is not 
• 
only a Platonist but also a Plotinis~ - different levels and rationes 
superiores and rationes interfores and rationes seminales unmistakably 
-
remind one of the emanations of Plotinus. 
st. Anselm (1033-1109) styled I1the last of the Fathers," "the Augustine 
of the eleventh centur,y," was a precursor of Albert the Great and st. Thomas 
Aquinas. Intuition, as a technical term, was used for the first time by 
st. Anselm in his Monologium where, wishing to distinguish between our 
lalowledga of God, especially in the next world, and our cognition of things 
created and finite, he quotes St. Paula ''We see now through a mirror in an 
obscure manner but then face to face" (St. Paul, I Cor. 13, 12), and 
explains, "Seeing God in an obscure manner is a speculation but seeing Him 
II 
face to face us an intuition. 
Albert the Great (1193-1280) dealt masterfully with the problem of 
universals and that of intuition. He indeed taught the universal erlsta in 
a threefold sense: (a) as Universale ~ rem, in the mind of God, (b) as 
Vniversale i:a!:!, and (c) as Universale post!:!!!. "Et tunc resultant tria 
formarum genera: unum quidem ante rem existens, quod est causa formativa; 
aliud autem est ipsum genus formarum, quae fluctuant in materia; tertium 
autem est genus formarum quod abstrahente intellectu separatur a rebus." 26 
Hence he solved the problem of universals correctly. This means also that 
he must have had the right understanding of intuitions in the Aristotelian 
Significance - the sense intuitions and those furnished by the "habit" of 
25 De Tr1n1tate, III, S, 13-19. 
26 De Natura Origine Animae Tractatus, I, 2. 
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the first principles~ Had there been no st. Thomas Aquinas we would 
probably be writing today about Intuitions in Albert the Great inStead of 
writing about those in st. Thomas. The Angelic ]iloctor took up his master's 
teachings and clarified tpem and made them firm and certain by the acumen of 
his own genius. BeSides, Albert the Great .... as still under the influence of 
Platonism and Neo-Platonism and knew Aristotle only in Latin translations 
from the Arabic and just in a fn instances from the Greek. It was St. 
Thomas who succeeded in procuring a new translation of Aristotle directly 
from the Greek and .... as able to see what the real Aristotle was. 
In the transition period from Scholastic to modern philosophy (1450-
1&(0) efforts were made by GeIDii.stus Pletho, a Greek scholar, to revive 
Plato's philosophy. For this purpose he inspired Cosmo de ~edici with the 
idea of founding a Platonic Academy at Florence. The famous cardinal 
Bessarion (1403-14?2) aided PIe tho in the work of expounding Platonism. 
During the same period intuitionism was thriving in the pantheism of 
Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and in the mysticism of Jacob Boehms. 
The new period of modern philosophy begins with Descartes (1596-165O). 
In the midst of his universal methodic doubt he held but one certain truths 
I think, therefore I 'exist. (Cogito, ergo sum.) Z7 First he doubts every-
thing, the thinking faculty itself and then all at once he is certain about 
his existence. This illogical emergence from the sea of doubt into the 
domain of one's existence is accomplished by Descartes' intuition. One 
simply wonders harr such a genius could venture to build his whole system of 
philosophy on the intuitions that stood on the ground of universal methodic 
Z7 Discours, Ivme partie. 
r 
I 
doubt. 
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), a pantheist, transformed the cartesian 
dualism into a pantheism wherein the means wherewith one can attain the 
knowledge of God, and consequently one's happiness and blessedness, is 
intuition. At the close of the EthiCS, Spinoza writes, "Blessedness 
16 
consists of love toward God ... No one rejoices in blessedness because he 
restrains lusts, but on the contrary, the" power of restraining lust comes 
from blessedness itself." And earlier in the Ethics he states,"Blessedness 
is nothing less than satisfaction of mind which arises from intuitive 
knowledge of God." 28 
Leibnitz (1646-1716), the founder of the German philosophy of the 
eighteenth century, was an intuitionist. According to him all our ideas 
:8 
are innate. Ideas exist potentially in the' mind. Wherefore to the 
scholastic principle, "Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in 
sensu", Leibnitz adds, except the intellect itself, "nisiipse intellectus. iO 
This is an innatism. Again he writes, Itlmowledge is adequate when every-
thing which enters into a distinct conception is again distinctly known or 
when the analysis is carried to the very end. When a notion has been 
rightly formed, we are not able to think all the elementary notions which 
enter into it at once but when this is possible, or insofar as it is 
possible. I term our knowledge intuitive." 31 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in combating , David Hume' s empiricism and 
pan-phenominalism went to another extreme - to intuitionism !. priori. 
2S Ethics, Conclusion. 
29 Nouveaux essaia. Preface 
30 Nouveaux essaia. II, i. 
31 Nouveaux essaia, II, i. 
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Kant'S categories are nothing but so many intuitions of that ld.nd. The 
• 
substances or noumena of things are not known at all. The phenomena may be 
known not, however, as they are in themselves but as modified by the 
different a priori or innate forms in our ~nd. Kant's twelve categories 
are so many avenues and methods of iIlDllediate or intuitive knowing. 32 Kant's 
whole moral order also rests on intuition, on the intuition of the principle, 
I ought. 33 
At length there comes Bergson (1859-1841) to propose a system of 
philosophy based entirely on intuition. What is Bergsonian intuition? Let 
him explain it to us himself. He writes: 
"Now the image has at least this advantage, that it keeps us in 
the concrete. No image can replace the intuition of duration but 
many diverse images borrowed from very different orders of things 
may be the convergence of their action, direct consciousness to 
the precise point where there is an intuition to be seized. EY 
choosing images as dissimilar as possible we shall prevent any one 
of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is intended to 
call up since it would then be driven away at once b.1 its rivals. 
EY providing that in spite of their differences of aspect, they 
all require from the mind the sarna kind of attention and in some 
sort the same degree of tenSion, we shall gradually accustom 
consciousness to a particular and clearly defined disposition, 
that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to itself 
as it really is, without any veil. But then consciousness must 
at least consent to make the effort for it will have been shown 
nothing - it will simply have been placed in the attitude it 
must take up in order to make the desired effort and so to come 
b.1 itself to the intuition." 34 . 
Thus Bergson speaks about the intuition of duration. Evidently he allows 
other things like diverse images, their activity, the consciousness of the 
human ego "conv<irge to the precise point where there is an intuition to be 
32 Wild, K. W., M.A., Intuition, Cambridge at the University Press, p. 51. 
33 The Critique of Practical Reason 
34 An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 14. 
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seizedlt and embodied in this ego •. Again he writes" itBy' intuition is meant 
• the kind of intellectual sympaDhy by which one places oneself within an 
object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently 
inexpressible." 35 
Speaking of the intuition of the movement as distinguished from that 
of duration" Bergson writes" liOn our personality" on our liberty" on the 
place we occupy in the whole of nature" on our origin and" perhaps" also on 
our destiny" it throws a light" feeble and vacillating but one which nonethe-
less pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us." 36 
Note haw Bergson ends the passage" n ••• but one which nonetheless 
pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us.1t Is 
this intuition somthing different from the intellect? Does this intuitive 
cognition proceed from a special faculty? Is it from the instinct? 
However" Bergson seems to distinguish between intuition and instinct. "The 
Ammophila no doubt discerns very little of that force, just what concerns 
itself} but" at least, it discerns it from lfithin quite otherwise than by a 
process of the knowledge, by an intuition (Lived rather than Represented)- 37 
But a little further he wri tea" "By intuition I mean instinct that has 
become disinterested, self-consCiOUS, capable of reflecting upon its object 
and of enlarging it indefinitely." Here he seems to identify instinct with 
reason since reason alone, as we know, can reflect and. become disinterested. 
And what does Bergson mean by "the kind of intellectual intuition"? Is it 
an artist's intuition or that of a philosopher? Or could it be both, the 
35 An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 6. 
36 Creative Evolution, p. 282. 
37 Creative Evolution, p. 183. 
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artist's insofar as he understands his subject matter - the philosopher's 
insofar as he penetrates to the bottom of things? However, one may be sure 
that Bergson does not mean here, nor anywhere else, a penetration to the 
bottom of things in the Scholastic sense. He may mean here the artist's 
understanding of his subject, and yet he has a special kind of intuition 
for him. He describes it thusr "B.y placing himself back within the object 
by a kind of sympathy, in" breaking down by an effort of intuition the 
barrier that space put between him and his model." 38 
Again, Bergson writes: "Our eyes are closed to the primordial and 
fundamental act of perception - the act constituting pure perception Whereby 
we place ourselves in the very heart of things." 39 Again, "Restore, on 
the contrar,y, the true character of perception; recognize in pure perception 
a system of nascent acts which plunge roots deep into the real and, at once, 
perception is seen to be radically distinct from recollecting; the reality 
is no more constructed or reconstructed but touched, penetrated, lived; and 
the problem at issue between realism and idealism, instead of giving rise to 
eternal metaphysical discussions is solved or rather dissolved b,y 
intui tion." lIJ 
In the first instance Bergson distinguishes between intuition and per-
ception, "at once perception is seen radically distinct from recollecting" 
(one image evoking another b,y a kind of intuition) 41 and in the second he 
seems to identify "pure perception" with "intuition" - Irwe are actually 
placed outside ourselves, we touch the reality of the object in an immediate 
38 Creative Evolution, p. 186 
39 Matter and Memory, pp. 73-71 
40 Matter and Memory, pp. 74-75 
41 Matter and Memory, p. 84 
intuition." 
-
• Again Bergson writes, "Thus intuition may bring the intellect to recog-
nize that life does not quite go into the category of the many, nor yet into 
that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give a 
sufficient interpretation of the whole process. Then, by a sympathetic 
communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living by 
the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us 
into life' s awn domain which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly 
continued creation. But though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is 
from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point 
it has reached. Without intelligence it would have remained in the form of 
interest and turned outward by its movements of locomotion." 42 
Remark what Bergson says at the close of the passage, "Without intelli-
gence it (intuition) would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to 
the special object of its practical interest and turned outward by its 
movements of locomotion." Hence it seems that Bergson identifies intelli-. 
gence conception vd th intuition. From what has been said it follows that in 
Bergson's teachings about intuition there are confusions,incompatibilities, 
contradictions, insolvable difficulties. However, the general character of 
Bergson's intuition is that of becoming by means of a certain sympatqy, one 
with the object outside the mind for the purpose of grasping and understand-
ing it, as well as for the purpose of growing and developing with it and 
that is what he calls a creative evolution, elan vital, a vital impulse, 
progress, and freedom of life. But is it real~ so? Can such a union with 
42 Creative Evolution, p. 187 
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creatures as Bergson proposes by his intuition be for the perfection of man-
• kind? Does the human mind really ..,rk and tend that way? Can man satisfy 
hiS hunger and thirst for knowledge by means of the intuition in question? 
These and similar questions one can solve only in the light of St. Thomas' 
system of philosophy, with Thomistic intuitions as a sure and safe intro-
duction thereto. 
CHAPTER II 
INTUITIVE KNOWLEOOE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMA.S 
The problem of intuitive knowledge cannot be solves unless the'nature 
of man is properly known and. evaluated. This was the main difficulty with 
Plato. He mew that scientific and philosophic cognition nru.st be something 
universal. At the same time, he clearly perceived that the knowledge of 
things we obtain from the outside is something entirely particular and 
singular. He could not reconcile the singular with the universal. There-
fore, to save the principle of the universality of scientific and philo-
sophic knowledge, he was obliged to ~eek the universals ~ parte rei, in the 
world of Ideas or Forms abiding somew~ere "beyond the clouds", although in 
reality abiding nowhere for there can be no such being as the hypostatized 
universal man, horse, cow, or anything else. .llready Porphyry (232-304 A.D.) 
uneasy about Plato's doctrine, asked the question: "Do the Genera and 
Species exist as things in the world of reality or are they mere products of 
the mind (sive subsistant, sive in nudis intellectibus posita sint)? He was 
unable yet to solve the problem. Therefore he simply said, "I decline to 
give the answer (dicere recuso)." 1 The Scholastics took up the discussion 
as it stood just in these terms I Are they (genera and species), or are they 
not, things. Those who replied in the affirmative received the name of 
realists; the others were mown as anti-realists. 
1 Migne, patr. Latina, Vol. LXIX, Col. 82. 
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The controvery continued for over a century. st. Thomas rejecting 
• platonic extrema realism, on the one hand, and the teachings of the nominal-
ists, on the other, solved once for all the problem in favor of moderate 
realism, of the common sense. 
"There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as 
considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as 
considered in nature of which it is ascribed for it is one 
thing to consider the universal man and another to consider a 
man as man. If therefore we take the universal in the first 
way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, 
can attain the universal because the universal is obtained by 
abstraction from individual matter on which every sensitive 
power is based." 2 
st. Thomas rose to the domain of the universals from the concrete order of 
things. Therefore he says, "The same thing can be universal and particular. 
(Idem potest esse universale et particulars)." 3 Plato could not possibly 
see this since according to him the soul stood to the body in the relation 
of a causa movens t and nothing else; the body being merely the organ which 
it uses to exert an external activity (anima utens corpore). In this con-
ception of man where the body did not enter as a constituent element into 
his being, there could be no question of substantial union between the 
spirit and the matter and consequently no question of obtaining the univer-
sals from the singulars by means of abstraction. Plato, therefore, was 
obliged to seek the universals elsewhere - in the world of Fbrms or Ideas. 
The fundamental question in Plato's theory of knowledge was that of 
anthropology. If Plato properly understood and evaluated man's nature, 
then the problem of epistemology would have been solved by him quite 
2 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 29, Art. 6. 
3 QQ. De Potentia, Q. 6, Art. 1, ad 1. 
otherwise. 
• 
st. Augustine, (a thorough Platonist), was saved from Plato's gross 
errors only qy the light of faith and the power of divine grace, though his 
Rationes Seminales and Rationes Aeternae (seminal and eternal reasons) still 
-
retained some germs of psychologic errors. 
Duns Scotus' fundamental propos! tion in psychology was this: Voluntas 
est superior intellectu, the will is superior to the intellect. The will 
-
is the moving agent and absolute master in the whole realm of the soul and 
everything must obey it. For this very reason Duns Scotus, although in his 
doctrine of the speculative functions he agreed mostly with st. Thomas, 
could not solve adequately and proper~ the problem of the theory of know-
ledge. The will is a blind faculty and consequently a very dangerous guide 
and master. Duns Scotus relying on the superiority of the will came to such 
perilous conclusions as these, The soul's nobility rests upon willing 
rather than knowing; freedom is the essence of the voluntary act; the 
immortality of the soul cannot be proven by metaphysical arguments nor can. 
God's omnipotence be proven by the light of reason; the good is good because 
God commands. Moreover Duns Scotus took special delight in' dwelling on the 
opposi tion existing between philosophy and theology of the Pagans and Arabs 
and he, himself, came dangerously near to the Averroistic principle that 
what is true in theology may be false in philosophy and vice versa. 4 
Therefore in Duns Scotus, the voluntarist, one should not look for the 
solution of the great epistemological problem. 
Neither can one find the solution of the same problem in Descartes. 
4 De Wulf, M., History of Medieval Philosophy, Longman,Green & Company, 
New York, Vol. II, pp. 81-85. 
~ Thi' philosopher by •• eing the e ••• n~ of mind in thought and the e •• enc:SOf 
I matter in extension considered body and spirit as constituting a d~lism of 
perfectly heterogeneous entities separated in nature by an absolute and 
5 
unfilled interval. Mind and matter, therefore, are antithetical. Hence 
the interaction between soul and body, as asserted by Descartes, was 
inconceivable. In this antithesis there is no room for the intuition and 
the abstraction and consequently no solution of the epistemological problem. 
Nei ther Leibni tz could solve this problem by his monads and pre-estab-
lished harmony since he too terribly misunderstood mants nature and psyChol-
ogy •. Neither Kant, nor Fichte, nor Schelling, nor Hegel could solve the 
same problem on the ground of their false conceptions about man. For in 
neither Kant's subjectivism, nor in Fichte's subjective idealism, nor in 
Schelling's idealistic monism, nor in Hegel's absolute idealism was man what 
he reall¥ is in himself in relation to his fellow creatures, to God, and in 
that to the universe in general. Failing therefore to understand him, they 
failed to solve his problems, in the first place that of his cognition - the 
problem of light wherewith to see things properly. Schopenhauer, the pessi-
mistic voluntarist, could not solve this problem for the same reason. 
The late Bergson, a professed intuitionist, could not solve the problem 
because of his own erroneous conceptions about man's reason (intellect). 
He unduly depreciated and mistrusted mants reason. Moreover, he claimed 
that man is part and parcel of the total cosmic movement and that all 
reality is but a manifestation of the same elan vital, vital impulse, as 
he termed it. 
5 Discourse on Method, VI, Meditation, p. 126. 
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EVer since Descartes proposed his doctrine of two substances which 
• IIlSant the antithesis between body and soul the philosophers who cam after 
him stood in revolt against thi~ dualism. We plainly see this revolt in 
the monism of Spinoza, in the materialism of the empiricists, and in the 
idealism of Berkeley. They all attempted to solve the problem of body and 
soul in man and that of the theory of knowledge, in other words, they tried 
to span the chasm between the soul and the body created by Descartes' 
mechanico - rationali~tic system of cognition. Some "solved" it at the 
expense of the mind as was the case with all materialists; others at the 
expense of the body as was the case with Berkeley and all such similar 
idealists; still others solved it at the expense of human individuality as 
was the case with 5pinoza. The revolt in question still goes on and the 
problem of human p~chology and that of the light to see the truth becomes 
still more complicated. For the solution of the problem one must turn to 
st. Thomas. 
Now how does St. Thomas consider man? For him man is what he really 
is, a "rational animal." True, this view of man he borrowed from Aristotle, 
but this only means that the great philosopher was correct in his definition 
of man. After all, St. 'lhomas himself was a most observant student of 
nature and reality, especially of man, studying and investigating him in his 
own personality not only by the light of reason but also by that of Divine 
Revelation; for which reason he gained a much deeper insight into human 
nature than ~istotle was ever able to do with his reliance on the light 
of reason alone. Both nature and grace tell him that man's actions are 
both material and spiritual or rational. Hence the source from which they 
coms must be material and spiritual or rational, for what is in the effect 
• 
must needs be found in its cause. 
But, then, what union does St. Thomas see between man's body and soul? 
It is like the one which Plato beheld when he claimed that the body is the 
tomb and mortal prison of the soul (c-J ~ 'i. v-i/f. ~ )1 6 Or is it like 
the one which Descartes saw when he asserted that the mind is ~ cogitans 
and the body !:!!. enensa, the latter carrying on its own operations like a 
machine by virtue of the impulse received from the soul, which is located 
by him in the pineal gland? 7 Or is that union like the one which Leibnitz 
perceived when he taught that the soul is a monad self-active, self-suffi-
cient, simply enveloped in an organic boqy? 8 In short, is the union 
between the body and the soul a merely accidental and mechanical one? No1 
st. Thomas sees, even as Aristotle did before him, the substantial union 
between them. This is the central doctrine in the teachings of St. Thomas 
about man. Body and soul are uni tad together as matter and form. Complete 
substantial nature belongs neither to the soul alone nor to the body alone· 
but to the compound of both. This compound is what it is, namely, a 
rational creature, a substance, a being by virtue of the soul. It is by 
virtue of the soul that the body has whatever belongs to it. But just as the 
body requires the soul in order to be what it is and to move and to live, 
the soul requires the body for its natural being and operation. The 
rational soul is superior to matter. In its highest operations the mind is 
b Phaedo, 82 83. 
Cratyl., 400 C. 
Phaedrus J 2~ C 
Gorg. 493 A. 
7 Principia Philosophiae, I, 48-50. 
8 Ibid.) 
-
independent of the body and i.s capable of surviving the body. 
2B 
Nevertheless 
• the soul needs ~he body in Ol'deX" to exercise its normal activity. It is the 
soul and the body substantial.~y united that stand out as the human person-
ality, a human being. After their separa.tion the body is only a corpse and 
then turns into a decomposed lila tter and the surviving soul remains a being 
in an unnatural state until it is reunited with the body after the latter's 
9 
resurrection. 
In the soul is the substQntial form and the body "the material element" 
of man's being. The soul is the active principle and the body the passive 
element. The rational soul is r~dically different from the body it ani-
mates. Nevertheless this rati.o~l soul has been created to be with the 
body and to form with it but One being, man. The result of this kind can be 
only the outcome of the substQ.nt).al union between the soul and the body in 
question. That is why st. Thomat', unlike Plato or Descartes, who, consider-
ing the soul as a substance comp:J.etely divorced from the body, located it 
ei ther in the brain as the Greek sage did whence it might control the move~ 
ments and operations of the whol~ organism or in the minute portion of the 
brain, called the pineal gland. a~ the modern sage did, whence it might 
regulate the animal mechanism (for such is man's body in the Cartesian 
conception) • St. Thomas, we Say I unlike them views the soul as wholly 
present in the whole body and in all its parts I ~ rationalis est tota 
10 
corpore !!i tota in gualibet ~rtEJ, corporis. But how is the soul present 
in all the body and in all its partS? St. Thomas answers that it is 
9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, !, Q. 76, Art. 1. 
10 Summa Theologica, '1, cQ'. ,J 7o", Ar't. 8. 
r 29 
present in all of them not by the totality of its virtue, but by the total-
• ity of its essence, Anima!ll ~ in g,ualibet parte corporis secundum 
iotalitatem essentiae, sed E£a secundum totalitatem virtutis.l1 This is a 
death blow to psycho-physical parallelism and monism. Those who advocate 
psycho-physical parallelism maintain that our psychical life is only a 
series of states without having any soul substance; that psychical acts and 
physiological actions are not the same realities; that there cannot be any 
efficient influence of the first on the second or vice versa. The best 
exponent of this theory was Professor Wundt of Leipzig (lS32-19a) 'Who 
denied the reality of substance. This is simply a psycho-physical pan-
phenomtnalism. 
Nevertheless it has its roots in Descartes' doctrine of two sub-
stances. For if the essence of mind is thought and the essence of matter is 
extension, we cannot locate these "substances" in the Aristotelian category 
of substance but must place them in the categories of accidents - in those 
of quantity and action. Again if there is between those two "substancesll 
but a mechanical union, then the outcome must be the psychO-PhYsical 
parallelism. But St. Thomas lays the axe at the root of the tree. He 
destroys all such theories by his doctrine of the substantial unity between 
body and rational soul. He bases his teaching on fact and observation' It 
is the very same man who understands and feels. ~se:idem homo !!!! qui 
percipi t ~ intelligere et sentire .12 .And those who advocate monism 
recognize that there must be some subj3 ct in which phenomena are rooted and 
which can account for the harmony and regularity they display. What is 
11 De Anima." Quaestio Disputata, Art. 9. 
,.,. 
12Sumrna Theologica,l I..,.Q.;' 7p,,:A!'JiJ.l. 
r that subject? .30 They do not name it but it may be well identified with the 
• 
one subject of Spinoza according to whom all the objects of the universe are 
onlY different manifestations of a single substance that enjoys the two 
irreducible attributes of thought and extension. Against this monism there 
stands St. Thomas I dualism - the human compound of the rational soul and 
the corporeal element substantially united between themselves. 1.3 This sub-
stantial unit is a person since person according to the classical definition 
of it by Boethius is nothing else than an individual substance endowed with 
reason, rationalis naturae indivdua substantia. And it is the person which 
is the source of all activity, of all phenomena in man. It is the complete 
individual substance that acts, Actiones sunt supposi~5?~J 14 
The schoolman Duns Scotus claimed that the body has its own special 
form, that of corporeity. Accordingly, the body is a body not by virtue of 
the soul as is the case in the doctrine of st. Thomas but by something 
different precisely by the form just mentioned, per formam corporeitatis. 
This cannot be. For this corporeity means that the body is already endowed 
with its own form and through the latter has already its awn existence. 
Thereafter no other form can come in aa the substantial form of the body. 
Thereafter every other form would be only its accidental form. This is 
Platonism and Neo-Platonism in Duns Scotus. St. Thomas teaches that the 
rational soul, being the substantial form of the body, informs the body in 
question and serves the functions of. life in all degrees since it Is natural 
for a higher form, like the soul, at once to contain and surpass the perfec-
tiona and vi tal energies of the inferior forms or souls those of the 
13 Summa Theologica, Q. 76, Art. 1 
14 In Primo Libro Sent. D. 5, Q. 1, Art. 1. 
sentient and vegetative orders. 15 
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In emphasizing the unity of human nature St. Thomas states that in the 
absence of such unity in man one could not account for the fact that the 
intensive exercise of one activity may interfere with that of others. (Una 
operatio cum fuerit intensa impedit alima.) This is certainly a daily ex-
perience. For when we are intensely preoccupied with our studies, we for-
get about being hungry at dinner time; on the contrary, we become averse to 
studies if we preoccupy ourselves too much with other things. In general, 
people greatly devoted to intellectual and spiritual pursuits care little 
about things material and those pursuing the paths of sentient life care, 
little about things spiritual and intellectual. All this plainly proves 
the most intimate relation between the spiritual and material elements in us. 
"From the soul and the body there results in us," says st. Thomas, lithe two-
fold unity of nature and person. ff16 
There is a dualism in St. Thomas but it is not the dualism of Plato, of 
Duns Scotus, of Descartes. The dualism of st. Thomas results in the oneness 
of human nature and personality, whereas the other dualism inevitably re-
sults in the destruction of the unity in question. There is a monism in 
St. Thomas but it is not the monism of Plotinus nor that of Spinoza, nor 
that of the idealistis, nor that of the materialists. The monism of St. 
Ihomas is the oneness resulting from the substantial union between the soul 
and the boqy comprising therefore the spiritual and the material elements 
and neither proceeding from nor modifying the Divine Substance as Plotinus 
and Spinoza imagined, respectively, but existing in the created and 
15 SUlIllIla Theologica, I, Q, 78, Art. 1; W. 77, A. 5-7 
16 Summa Theologica, III, Q. 2, Art. 9, ad 3. 
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ontological order of things. With these notions in our mind let us approach 
the subject matter of intuition. 
What does the eye perceive. The colored object. What does the ear 
hear? The Sound. What is the hand able to touch? The extended thing. 
What is the tongue able to taste? The savory matters. Every sense has its 
own proper object which it primarily and directly (primo at per se) 
perceives. This first and immediate perception of the sentient order, 
especially the perception of an object by the eye, is for st. Thomas an 
intuition. "A thing is known," says St. Thomas, "in three wayss first, by 
the presence of its essence in the knower as light can be seen in the eye; 
secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it as 
stone is seen by the eye !rom its image being in the eye; thirdly, when the 
image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself but 
from something else in whioh it is made to appear as when we behold a man 
in a mirror." 17 Herein lies the key to the solution of the problem of 
intuition right from the beginning. Take the first way, "A thing is known 
by the presenoe of its essence in the knolrer as light can be seen in the 
eye." By reason of this principle I possess within me the sound when I 
hear the bell or music; the Sll'setness when I taste sugar; the fragrance 
when I smell a rose; the warmth when I put my hand into a basin of warm 
water. I possess all such qualities right within me, within m;y very being. 
To be sure, they are not known by me in the same way as the light is known 
when I see it in the eyes of my fellow creatures; nevertheless they an 
just as certa1nly known and experienced by me with my different senses as 
17 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 56, Art. 3. 
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the light is through my eyes. All my senses are given me for conveying 
• impressions with certainty and without fail but, of course, each one in its 
own way. 
Again it is impossible for me to see and to mow the light in my own 
eye (unless, of course, I see it in the reflection of it in a mirror). How-
ever, I can see the light wi thin me by maans of my intellectual eye. For 
instance, I can at once see the truth in my mind that a whole is greater 
than any of its parts. But if this manner of !moTdng things is viewed in 
relation to the outside world, then we must say that our mind cannot see the 
presence of the essences of things except through the senses and byway of 
abstraction. Only in heaven shall we see God face to face. 18 Only there 
shall we see God immediately and everything else in Him. Only there our 
entire being will be filled with His presence. This will be the most per-
fect way of mowing and loving God. Hence, continuing to explain the three-
fold manner of knowing things St. Thomas writes: "To the first named class 
t~~t knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence and 
knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural 
principles." 19 
Again, "A thing is mown, secondly, by the presence of its similitude 
in the power which knows it as a stone is seen by the eye from its image 
being in the eye." This manner of mowing things is that in which especial-
ly the eye gains mowledge of them. What then is this similitude? It is 
nothing else than what st. Thomas calls the expressed species, species 
expressa. 20 
18 I Cor. 13, 12. 
19 IQ!.S..) 
20 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 85, A. 2. 
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We know the eye receives the impressions from the outside world. The 
. . 
result of these impressions is the expressed species, sE2cies' expressae, 
which in reality are so many similitudes or likenesses of the things in the 
concrete order of things. Bergson claims that to knaw- a thing one must 
enter into it. We, too, say that one must penetrate things, go into the 
bottom of things, in order to gain knowledge of their natures, essences. 
But the mind alone can do this. The senses are passive organs. They re-
ceiva things. Hence the eye cannot enter into a thing, identify itself with, 
grow and expand with it by a kind of sympathy producing thus, as Bergson 
believes, a new creation. Yes, this is the process in the Bergsonian in-
tuition. The Thomistic intuition is different. It is not we who enter 
into a thing but it is the thing that enters into us. In this initial 
intuition we remain as passive agents on whose senses and organs the things 
register or impress themselves. We simply look or gaze or marvel at what 
is happening. And this is what the Latin verb intueri, whence the word 
intuition has derived really means. 21 The l~rlcon tells us so. As soon 
as we open our eyes on God's world, this marvelous and mysterious phenomenon 
of intuition in its initial stage takes place in us. Hence it is not we 
who seek things but the things seek us by impressing themselves on our eyes 
or other organs. Accordingly, it is not we who identify ourselves 'With 
things but it is the things that identify themselves with us through the 
~terious species impressa. It is only in this way that we ourselves 
become in a psychological and immaterial way things, the world, the uni-
verse I For there is no limit to the impressions we receive and can receive 
21 Baldwin, J.M., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 1, MaCmillan, 
New York 1 1 
from the outside world. It is for this reason that St. Thomas teaches 
vr.ith Aristotle that the soul, in a certain way, becomes all things- by 
gaining lmowledge of them. (Cognoscendo anima quodam modo fit omnia.)22 
This is realized by the e:xpressed species. The impressions come and go 
35 
but the "expressions", that is, the ~~s or the expressed species after 
them remain in the soul. For this the organ must be really healthy and 
normal. Some persons have apparently perfect eyes but in reality they do 
not see. This is because the optic nerve does not function. The things 
impress themeel ves on the surface of the eye but they do not register on 
the retina, a sensitive surface at the back of the eyeball)because the 
communication between it and the optic nerve does not function. The 
outcome is that things leave in the eye no expressed species and the parson 
does not see anything, in other words, that person is blind even though he 
has apparently good eyes. From this we see that the species expressa is 
indispensable for the intuition proper to the eye. Once we have the ex-
pressed species then the intuition has been completed; in it and with it 
and through it we possess the things themselves. Hence cognoscendo anima 
fit quodam modo omnia. This is true, in the first place, of the sentient 
intuitions and then of the intellective intuitions and of cognition in 
general. For this reason St. Thomas writes: HAs good has the nature of 
what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything in-
sofar as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in 
~ Anima III that the soul is in !Qm!. manner all things through the senses 
22 1& AainJa, 3, 37c. 
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and the intellect. And therefore as good is convertible with being, so 
is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, ~ the 
true adds relation to the intellect." 23 
In this wondrous and ~sterious psychological process of intuition 
whether sentient or intellective, two principles of St. Thomas have to be 
kept in mind if one is to understand anything at all about the problem in 
question. The first is, "Every cognition is realized in the image and 
likeness of the thing knO'Wll in the knower." (Omnis cognitio fit secundum 
similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente.) 24 And the second, "The thing known 
is in the knower according to the mode of the knower." (Cognitum est in 
cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentiso)25 
From the first principles just stated we infer that the possession 
of a thing through intuition or other knowledge is not an appropriation 
of it in its physical qualities, as the ancient philosopher, Democritus, 
believed, alleging that all knowledge is realized by means of certain 
emanations or images coming from objects outside of us and entering into 
our body, organs, our entire being, in order to enable us to see and know 
the objects from which they emanated, but the possession of it in its psycho~ 
logical and immaterial properties by some sort of the resemblance of it 
achieved in us. From the second principle of St. Thomas, stated above, we 
conclude that the species expressa in the intuitive cognition is more than 
a mare resemblance, that it is an image or likeness or resemblance which 
is an imitation, a reproduction of the thing outside of us according to the 
23 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 16, Art. 3. 
24 Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, Chap. 77. 
25 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 14, Art. 1, ad3. 
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natura of the knowing subject of ourselves. Hence the image, likeness, 
• 
resemblance in question is not a material or physical image, likeness, 
resemblanoe like that of a photograph, for example, but an image, a likeness, 
a resemblance of another kind, that which we may call nth the Scholastics a 
psychical, ideal, mental likeness, image, resemblance. This way the intel-
lect ennobles things material because they assume in it a higher mode of 
existence than the one in which they exist in the order of reality. In 
themselves they exist materially; in the mind immaterially. 
By the expressed speoies (species e:xpressa) the intuition of the 
sentient order is, as already mentioned, complete. For then the sense 
organ and the faculty are in possession of the image am likeness of an 
object in the external world. The subject carries in himself the image and 
likeness thereof and views it as an ~diate and direct presentation of 
what is in the outside world. But to come baok to the manner of knowing 
things. St. Thomas says, "A thing is mown, thirdly, when the image of the 
object known is not drawn directly from the object itself but from something 
else in which it is made to appear as when we behold a man in a mirror." 
What do we see in something else as in a mirror? Many things. In 
the light of day we see everything that presents itself to our view; in 
the darkness of night we behold the moon and the stars. In a fish pond 
we see fishes in the water. Are these acts so many intuitions? Indeed 1 
For they are direct and immediate perceptions of things in something else. 
However, when we say with St. Paul that "the invisible things of God are 
26 e. 1, 20. 
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clearly seen being understood by the things that are made," we are no 
longer in the domain of intuitive knowledge but in that of discursive 
cognition, else we would be in the same position with the ontologists who 
imagine they see God intuitively. TO see God's wisdom, goodness, the rest 
of His attributes, and Himself in His creatures demands much reflection, 
profound study, the notion of causality, the logic of induction. All this 
is not a simple intuition but a most complicated and difficult process of 
knowledge~ Besides, if we knew God intuitively as the ontologists claim, 
there would be no atheists for everyone would see God and be happy in seeing 
Him. Unfortunately, there are man;y atheists in the world and none of us is 
happy as though we were already in the Beatific Vision of God. Hence 
st. Thomas referring to the third way of knowing things says again, "The 
third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on 
earth by His likeness reflected in creatures. According to the Romans, I, 
20, 'The invisible things of God are clearly sean being understood by the 
things that are made.' Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. n27 
However there can be an intellective intuition in the third way 
whereby a thing is seen as in a mirror. That I can be sitting and standing 
at the same time involves, logically, a contradiction in terms and I know 
that this is something impossible, physically and ontologically. I see this 
truth at once with hardly any reflection on my part. This is an instance 
of an intellective intuition. Of this intUition, as well as of other kinds 
of intellective intuitions, we will speak later. Here we must chiefly 
speak of the senses, the sense cognition and perceptions. 
27 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 56, Art. 3. 
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We find ourselves in the midst of things material. We are living in 
the concrete order of things. This means that we are in one way ~r another 
in constant contact with the external world. Take the Aristotelian cate-
gories and view them one by one, substance, quantity, relation, quality, 
action, passion, place, time, and the rest. We are in the midst of these 
categories in the concrete order of things. They all affect us this way 
or that way. A tree is a substance with its own quantity, relation, 
quality, action, passion, and the like. When we see it we are invariably 
affected by it, differently in winter and differently in spring. A brute 
animal is a substance with its own attributes. It affects us in one way 
when we see it in a barn and in another way when we see it as meat on our 
table and eat it. Each of our fellow creatures is a substance with his or 
her own attributes. They all affect us as soon as we come in contact with 
them - sometimes pleasantly, sometimes otherwise. The channels through 
which the outside world exercises its influence on us are, as we know, our 
different senses, the eye, the ear, and the rest of them. What they con-
vey belongs to the general domain of our intuitions. For it is not only 
the eye that makes us by means of its species expressa directly conscious of , 
external objects, but the other senses do this also though, of course, in a 
different way. If I prick my finger with a needle, I at once experience 
pain. '!his is a direct lmow1edge of pain through the sense of touch. This 
is an intuition based on the sense of touch. Similarly, there are intu-
itions founded on the sense of taste, on that of smell, on that of hearing. 
That is why in the science lmown as epistemology all the senses are vindi-
cated as the trustworttw fountains of our cognition. The whole world con-
fronts us. We receive the world through our senses. From this one can 
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easily see how rich and varied our sense intuitions may be. Whatever is 
in the world may act upon us and impress us after ~ 2!U fashion~nd 
leave in us II its expression" after Q!!!:. QY!n. fashion. "Cognitum est in 
Cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis!" The mineral matter, the plant, the 
brute animal, the man may act on the sentient part of us and impress us 
accordingly. In fact such things and beings daily act upon us and enrich 
the store of our intuitions. Most of the time we are simply swayed by them 
instead of using them for the benefit of ourselves and of our fellow 
creatures. St. Thomas acted otherwise. By the power of abstraction he 
rose above them and appropriated them. Out of them he got universal ideas 
with which he built the wondrous system of his philosophy. 'Ihrough them 
he went to the very source whence they came; that is, the external world. 
In this he discovered the foundation for his universal ideas in things 
themselves. Through them he also diacovered their prototypes in Godls 
mind - the universalia ~ t!!!!.. The outcome of all this was his system 
of philosophy founded on moderate realism. Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz 
could not do this because they divorced the matter from the spirit, the 
body from the rational soul. Nor could the idealists like Berkeley do 
this for the simple fact that they reasoned away the matter. From them 
matter, as such, did not exist. Nor were the materialists capable of 
constructing any such system of philosophy because the,y reasoned away 
man's mind. For them the whole of man was but sense and matter. 
The system of St. Thomas' philosophy is that of common sense and 
sound reason. This is because he properly understood and evaluated the 
sense intuitions in the light of the substantial union between man's boqy 
and soul. On this ground he could clearly see that what enters the sense 
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region cannot but go into the domain of the intellect and reason. 
"Anima est tota in tota corpore et tota in singulis partibus corp<1ris. 1t 
The soul is present in all the body and in all its parts. Again" HEx 
anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas naturae 
et personae." From the soul and the body there is in each one of us the' 
twofold unity of nature and person. Therefore what affects the body must 
also affect the soul and vice versa. The soul cannot be affected without 
affecting the body. ( Summa Theologica I, Q. 76, Art. e.) 
From the fact of the substantial unity of body and soul st. Thomas 
draws the conclusion that it is one and the same subject that understands 
and feels. "Idem ipse home est qui se parcipit se intelligere et se 
sentire." 28 In other words" we predicate all our actions of one and the 
same subject which we call ego or self. Therefore it is I who think" 
reflect" study" who feel the fatigue thereof" suffer" live" eat" drink" and 
the like. Furthermore" on this substantial union between the rational soul 
and the body" on this ego or self, St. Thomas bas'es the fundamental prin-
ciple for the whole range of human cognition, epistemology, theor,y of 
knowledge which principle he took from the great Aristotle and which reads 
as follows: 1I~~n's intellect is (in the beginning) like a tablet on which 
there is nothing written. (Sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.)tt::e 
But what is the proof of this? st. Thomas gives it in the ver,y sam 
article when he writes. uThe falseness of this opinion (he means Plato's 
opinion) is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense is wanting the 
knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also, for 
28 Summa Theologica. I, Q. 7S', Art. 1. 
29 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 84, Art. 3. 
r ~ostance, a "'0 Who is born blind can haw no Imowledge ot colors 0. 42 This 
'WOuld not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible 
things." 30 Thence arose the scholastic adage that there is nothing in 
man's intellect unless it passes first through his senses. (Nihil est in 
intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensibus). And since, as we know, there are 
external senses those of sight, of hearing, of touch, of taste, of smell, as 
mentioned previously, and the internal senses such as the common sense 
(sensus communis), phantasy, aestimative or cogitative faculty, memory, the 
principle here enunciated holds true of all those senses in general and of 
each one in particular. This means that all our senses are so many 
channels of sense cognition. 
Therefore each of those senses, either external or internal, is a 
source of an intuitive knowledge for us. St. Thomas expresses this truth 
by saying that it is not in the nature of the sense faculty to know things 
by composition and division, in other words, to come to the knowledge of 
things by joining predicate to subject by the copula, est, or by denying 
predicates of subjects by the negative form of the same copula; that is, 
!!2a est. Our intellect alone can do this and therefore it alone can possess 
reflective and discursive knowledge of things. While commenting on the 
doctrine of Aristotle, St. Thomas writes: "Cognitions of purely sentient 
nature are not drawn from principles and causes but they are begotten by the 
very fact that the sentient object stands out before this or that sense and 
impresses itself upon it~ To proceed from causes to their effects or vice 
versa is not in the nature of the senses and sentient faculties - the 
30 .SUmma. Theologica,· i,' Q. 84, Art. 3. 
1 . 31 intellect a one can do this. 
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However, the greatest source of sentient intuition seems to lie in the 
common sense (sensus communis) since it is an organic faculty whereby we at 
once perceive and distinguish both the sensations and the objects which pro-
duee them by acting on our external senses here and now. What a vast and 
rich source of intuitions it is1 All the rest of the intuitions find their 
place in it and finally disappear from it into our subconciousness to be 
part and parcel of our personality and to influence our whole life, now 
consciously, according to the circumstances of time, place, persons, and 
the rest. The next greatest source of sentient intuitions lies probably in 
the cOg1tative faculty whereby one at once and immediately sees and 
apprehends what is useful and good for him, on the one hand, or what is 
evil and harmful to him, on the other. The eye, ear, the touch, the taste, 
the smell - they all, each in its own way, contribute their intuitions to 
it for the good of man that he may live and prosper. 
In ~ similar vein one could speak of 'the intuitions of every sense and 
faculty but what we have mentioned concerning the intuitions of the Sensus 
communis and of the cogitative faculty suffices for us here to see the 
importance of sense intuitions in the life of the individual. and in that of 
mankind. 
For so many philosophers, from the dawn of human thought until our own 
days, sense intuitions were often occasions and fertile sources of mistakes, 
errors, with the resultant misfortunes and calamities for mankind since men 
are always powerfully influenced by systems of philosophy even despite 
31 Metaphysics, 6, L. 1. 
". ~bOmS.1V.S, 44 especially nowadays when human thoughts quickly travel around 
• 
the world by means of newspapers" magazines" radio broadcasts" lectures" 
books and ever so many other channels influencing and swaying men and 
women" now this way" now that way in their very lives. This is especially 
true of mass movements. Once a mass movement is started by a false philos-
ophy as Communism, for instance, by Karl Marx's philosophy, it becomes in 
the course of time a tremendous power for the overthrow of the "old order 
of things," nay, of the very principles on which the right kind of philos-
ophy" life, and reforms should be built. 
There were always two classes of philosophers for whom sense intuitions 
or visions were occasions and sources of mistakes and errors. The idealist 
type of sagas of different shade and hue like Plato in the ancient world, 
Plotinus in the early Christian centuries, then Berkeley and others in 
modern times" unable to reconcile the sense intuitions with the higher 
order of human cognitions, rejected them as though something unworthy of 
human nature. The ht\rm done thereby to humanity is evident. For philos-
ophy which is not grounded on sense cogni tiona and intui tiona cannot stand 
on its own principles; it has to be supported by Plato.s world of Ideas or 
Forms, by Plotinus' emanations, by Berkeley's "dependence on mind." Such 
a philosophy is not proper to man" composed as he is of matter and spirit" 
the body, and the rati?nal soul. Such a philosophy is one-sided philosophy 
and inevitably embodies flagrant errors and propagates still more flagrant 
ones. Let us take but one instance from the pseudo-Dionysiusf 
"Unto this Darlmess which is beyond Light we pray that we may 
come and may attain unto vision through the loss of sight and 
knowledge and that in ceasing thus to see or to know" we may 
learn to lmow that which is beyond all perception and under-
standing (for this e~tying of our faculties is true sight and 
knOwledge), and that we may offer Him that transcends all things 
the praises of a transcendant hymnody which we shall do by 4 
denying or removing all things that are ••• 
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"It is not soul or mind or endowed with the faculty of imagination, 
conjecture, reason, or understanding... It is not number or order 
or greatness or littleness or equality or inequality... It is not 
immovable nor in motion or at rest and has no power and is not 
power or light and does not live and is not life; nor is It 
personal essence or eternity or time... • •• nor is It one nor is 
It unity nor is It Godhead or Goodness; nor is It a Spirit as we 
understand the term since It is not Sonship or Fatherhood; nor 
is It any other thing such as we or any other being can have 
knowledge of; nor does It belong to the category of non-esistence 
or to that of existence... It transcends all affirmation by 
being the perfect and unique Cause of all things and transcends 
all negation by the pre-eminence of Its simple and absoly~e 
nature- free from every limitation and beyond them all. j 
This is a description of the Absolute and of one's union with the Absolute 
and Transcendent Being. What does it mean? One may be certain that it is 
not the correct description of the Absolute nor of the rational creature's 
union with Him. "It is simply the Plotinian ~sticism carried to its 
ultimate expression. In the words of Sir Thomas Browne it is 'Christian 
annihilation, extasis, liquifaction, transformation, the kiss of the Spouse, 
gustation of God, and ingression into the divine shadow.' The ecstatic 
philosophy of Plotinus introduced by the pseudo-Dionysius into Christianity 
became a perennial source of heterodox ~sticism through the Middle Ages 
and down to the present day." 33 
Our images and ideas must be regulated and corrected by the objective 
reality outside of us, else we will be inevitably carried away by them into 
the realm of phantasy and unreality. This is evidently the case of the 
idealist philosophers who discard sense intuitions and refuse to admit the 
32 More, P. E., Hellenistic Philosophies, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, pp. 240-251. 
33 Hydrotaphia, Conclusion; p. 249. 
reality of the senses and the concrete order of things. Preoccupied only 
with the ideal, they finally lose their balance. (Una operatio cum fuerit 
intensa, impedit aliam.) 
On the other hand, the materialistic philosophers go to another 
extreme by rejecting the ideal order of things. For the ancient school of 
the Cyrenaic philosophy headed by Aristippus (born about the year 435 B.C.) 
the only criterion of knowledge we possess lies in the sensations or 
immediate affections, and so to use the technical term of modern philosop~, 
in the intuitions. Of these alone we are certain, whereas of the causes 
underlying them we can have no sure cognition. We know at once when a 
thing is white or sweet; we see its whiteness with our eyes; we taste its 
sweetness with our tongue but we can say nothing certain of what lies 
behind or beyond these sensations of ours. On this kind of intuitionism is 
based ever.y materialism, empiricism, positivism, hedOnism, relativism, 
ancient or modern. Professor Whitehead says: "All knowledge is derived 
from and verified by direct intuitive observation. I.accept this axiom of 
empiricism as stated in this general form. 1t 34 He (Professor lThitehead) 
" finds that we have intuitions of probability, of inheritance, of memory, of 
new mental material, of the society of our personal experiences, of final 
causes, of God as intuition, or put in another way, of God as indicator of 
value." 35 Modern intuitionists do not rise above the realm of sense 
intuitions. Modern intuitionists explain by the intuition everything - God 
Himself and eternal truthsl It me~ns that God and eternal truths do not 
34 Adventures of Ideas, p. 177; (See Intuition by Wild, K. W., M.A.,) 
cambridge at the University Press, 1938, p. 83. 
35 Adventures of Ideas, p. 87, Process and Reality. 
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transcend the realm. of sense intuitions, that God Ilnd eternal truths have 
no objective reality. and they are only so DBny subjective indicators of 
'V8lues. Such is the philosophy divorced .trom the rational and ideal element 
in man; that is, from his rational soul' 
St. Thomas avoided the fatal and disastrous mistakes of the idealists, 
as 11'1911 as the still more fatal and disastrous mistakes and errors of 
materialists because he knew man's true nature and psychology. Therefore 
he did not reject the sense intuitions as the idealist always did as some 
unworthy accretion but accepted them ,as indispensably belonging to human 
nature and as immediate evidences of the external world outside of us and 
of the internal world within us. Nor did he remain in the sentient world, 
external and internal, as though it were the only reality. Mindful of the 
substantial unity between the soul and the body in DBn, he used the world 
belonging to the body, that is, the sentient world and sense intuitions, 
as so many means of reaching the world belongil1g to' the soul, that is, the 
immaterial world, and of gaining intellective intuitions. In this way he 
built the domain of moderate realism against idealism, on the one hand, and' 
materialism, on the other. On the certitude of sentient intuitions, St. 
Thomas has built a mighty system of philosophy as lasting as mankind itself 
and that, too, for the good and salvation of man. 
• 
CHAPTER III 
SINGULARS AND SENSES 
IN THE IN'IUITION 
OF ST. THOllJ.S 
William James in his preface to his two huge volumes on IJThe Princi-
pIes of Psychology, II writes: "All attempts to explain our phenomenally 
given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities whether the latter be 
named 'soul, Transcendental Ego, Ideas,' or 'Elementar,y Units of Con-
sciousness,' are metaphysical. This book, consequently, rejects both the 
associationist and the spiritualist theories and in its strictly posi-
tivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel 
tempted to claim originality.1t 1 
As we lmow, William Jams was the chief advocate and promoter of 
Pragmatism in America, a philosophy which claims that a test of truth lies 
in utility and practical consequences of a man's actions for his life, so 
that he (each man in particular), with his needs and demands and his crav-
ings for the enjoyment of life to be satisfied, becomes in the words of that 
ancient sage, Protagoras, IJthe measure of all tbings. 1J On pragmatism, 
positivism and sensism the whole of philosophy of William James is based. 
1 James, William, The Principles of Psychology, Henry and Company, New York, 
Vol. 1. 
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However, in this he is not original at all as he "feels tempted to claim." 
• 
St. Thomas, treading in the footsteps of Aristotle and using the sense 
data as the foundation for MODERATE REALISM, may be called, in a certain 
sense, a pragmatist, an empirist, a positivist par excellence. Herein 
lias the true originality of St. Thomas. The originality to which William 
James lays claim is only a shadow in comparison to that of St. Thomas. 
William James' pragmatism, empiricism and positivism is lifeless, dead, 
because a useful good is considered in it as the highest criterion of 
truth; whereas st. Thomas' "pragmatism, empiricism and positivism" is preg-
nant with life and dynamism because it is the ground from which arises and 
on which firmly rests the highest and most powerful system of philosophy -
that of Scholastic philosophy. 
st. Thomas knows with Aristotle that the sense data, the senses, the 
sense faculties, and sense intuitions, are inevitably bound up with the 
useful good (bonum utile) for the preservation of the individual life and 
the procreation of the species. This is quite apparent when we examine 
the objects of our senses. What is the object of the eye, for instance? 
The colored object. Why must the eye see the colored object? Is it to 
enjoy the beauty of things seen? But the eye, a sentient organ, cannot see 
and appreciate the unity in variety, that is, the chief element of beautyl 
This can be done only by the «,ye of the higher order, that is, by our 
intellect. So the eye, this purely sentient organ, must have been given to 
the animal for the purpose of seeing what is necessary for the preservation 
of the sentient individual life and the multiplication of the species 
through mating and division of labor. Similarly, one can speak of the rest 
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of the senses. What is the object of the ear, to take another example? 
• 
sound. But why must the ear hear the sound? Is it to enjoy the music 
conveyed by the sound? But the sentient organ of the ear is unable to 
perceive and appreciate the harmony and melodies conveyed by the sound. The 
intellect alone can do so. Hence, the ear this purely sentient organ, is 
given the animal for some entirely different purpose, for that of enabling 
the animal to hear the sounds and noises connected with the preservation of 
its life and that of the species. Or take the estimative faculty, able at 
once to discern what is useful and good, on the one hand, or what is harmful 
and evil, on the other. What is it for? For the same purpose as the eye 
and the ear, that is, to preserve oneself and one's species, availing 
oneself in this of the perceptions of the eye and those of the ear, of those 
of the touch, and the rest of the sentient perceptions and cognitions. In 
all this St. Thomas is truly an empirist, a pOSitivist, a pragmatist. With 
William James he can say that truth is not "transcendental" but ambulatory 
and that there is no truth outside of experience •. And with Pragmatists in. 
general St. Thomas can repeat Protagoras I principle that man is the measure 
of aJ.1 things, for everything that is seen by his eye or perceived by his 
ear and the rest of his senses does not transcend him or his needs and 
demands, but is ordained for him and for the satisfaction of his needs and 
requirements. St. '!bomas in this respect is not only in accord with 
William James but with any sensist or materialist, as for instance, 
He1vetius, Thomas Hobbes, and others. And yet there is a radical difference 
between st. Thomas' sensism, pragmatism, materialism, and the one which 
they advocated. Wherein lies the difference? In thiS, that they did not 
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rise above the sense intuitions, and entirely confined their system of 
philosoPhy within their limits, whereas st. Thomas rose above the sense 
intui tiona and used them as the groundwork for his system of philosophy. 
HoW he did this we will show later. At present we DRlst confine ourselves 
to the analysis of singular or individual things acting upon the senses in 
the intuitions of St. Thomas. What does he then mean by singular things 
and the senses? 
Singulare proprie sumitur pro individuo says st. Thomas with 
Aristotle.;2 The singular stands for the individual. This individual may 
be a mineral matter, a plant, a brute animal, a man, or anything else in 
the world. Subsisting in the world of reality this mineral matter or this 
plant, or this brute animal, or this man, or anything else, holds its own 
position in time and space, performs its own functions, chemical or other-
wise, that is, its vital functions of nutrition, growth, reproduction, as 
is the case with all living things, and exercises its influence on the 
outside world, chemically, functionally, vitally, or in any other way; for 
even a tiny pebble by the very fact that it occupies a certain definite 
space on the ground, however small that space may be, bears a certain rela-
tion to the earth and thereby exercises a certain influence on it; that of 
being in the midst of others for the completion of God's creation, wherein 
the highest and the lowest things find their suitable place and occupation. 
Man occupies the highest position and place aMOng them. However, he is not 
independent of them. Through the material element of him, that is, his 
2 Phys. I, 1 
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body, he is related and bound up with them and cannot do without them. 
Hence, wherever he happens to be or live they inevitably act on his body 
and his bodily senses and organs and, through these, on his whole being. 
\Vhen St. Thomas says that the singular stands for the individual he 
thereby means any individual substance in the world of reality outside of 
us, including, of course, our own fellow creatures. Further he thereby 
means that this world of reality acts in one way or another upon our senses, 
the eye, the ear, the touch, and the rest. 
St. Thomas admits with Aristotle five external and four internal 
senses. Inquiring whether the five exterior senses are properly distin-
guished he quotes first of all what Aristotle said on this particular point, 
that there is ~ other besides the five senses,3 and then in the body of 
the article says, "The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior 
senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses 
properly and per~. Now sense is a passive power and is naturally immuted 
by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation 
is what is per ~ perceived by the sense and according to the diversity of 
that exterior ca'Q.se are the sensitive powers diversified. t• 4 And in the 
-following article of the same question inquiring whether the interior senses 
are suitably distinguished, St. Thomas quotes Avicenna who assigned five 
interior senses or powe rs, namely, common sense, phantasy, imagination, 
~ estimative !!E. ~morative powers. 5 Nevertheless, St. Thomas says that 
3 De Anima, III, L, 1. 
4 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 78, Art. 4. 
5 De Anima, IV, 1. 
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there is no need of the middle power between the estimative and imaginative. 
He writes, "Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the 
imaginative a fifth power which combines and divides imaginary forms, as 
when the imaginary form of gold and the imaginary form of a mountain, we 
compose the one form. of a golden mountain which we have never seen. This 
operation is not to be found in animals other than man in whom the imagin-
ative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this 
action in his book, "De Sensu Et Sensibilibus (VIII)." So there is no need 
to assign more than four interior powers of the estimative and memorative 
6 powers." 
All the senses, organs and sentient powers are evidently in the body, 
but the source from which they all arise is the same as that whence the 
body itself has its own life, that is, the rational soul or the substan-
tial form of the human compound, man. The senses, the organs, the sentient 
faculties are so many· accidents in this human compound and actualizations 
of the potentialities of the material element thereof, that is, the body. 
They all belong to the human ego and are instruments for the realization 
and manifestation of its life. The human ego lives and operates in the 
world of concrete reality and through the body extended in space and subject 
to time and through the bodily senses, organs, and faculties. St. Thomas 
expresses all this in the following words: 
"We mst assert that the intellect which is the principle of 
intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For 
that whereby primarily anything that acts is a form of the 
thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, 
6 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 78, Art. 4. 
that whereby a body is primarily healed is health and that 
whereby the soul primarily knows is knowledge; hence, health. 
is a form of the body and knowledge is a form of the soul. 
The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in 
the act; wherefore, a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. 
Now it is clear that the first thing by which the boqy lives 
is the soul. And as life appears through various operations 
in different degrees of living things, that whereby we pri-
marily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. 
For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, 
sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understand-
ing. Therefore, this principle by which we primarily under-
stand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual 
soul is the form of the body." 7 
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And to stress the idea that there really is the substantial union between 
man's rational soul and body, the former animating, the latter giving it its 
corporeity, its faculties, organs, senses and whatever else it possesses 
for the life and perfections of the human ego, St. Thomas continues: "But 
if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he 
must first explain how is it that this action of understanding is the 
action of this particular man for each one is conscious that it is himself 
who understands." S 
From the above doctrine concerning the substantial union between the 
rational soul and the body it necessarily follows that the body shares in 
the life and activity of the soul concerned and that the soul participates 
in the life and activity of the body in question. This must be well kept 
in mind 'When we ~re dealing with the intuitive knowledge of things in man. 
tat us analyze this knowledge in each of the senses. 
In the intuitive knowledge of the eye we see wonders which no 
scientist, no philosopher can ever explain. Being such a small organ, it 
7 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 76, Art. 1. 
S Thid., 
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takes in, however, everything that is presented to its view - mineral 
.. 
matter, plants, brute animals, men, villages, towns, Cities, fields, forests, 
rivers, lakes, oceans, the sun, the moon, the stars, in short, the whole 
universe. The eye of the brute animal sees also such things, nevertheless 
it sees not in them what the human eye does. The brute animal eye sees in 
them only what its animal instinct impels it to behold therein, namely, 
only the preservation of the individual and of the species. The light 
wnerewith they behold things reveals to them in them only food and what 
, 
pertains to the preservation of their species. The human eye is different./ 
In its intuitions it beholds the order and harmony among things in the 
uni verse, the beauty of the skies, revealed by the sun during the day and 
that of the starry heaven by night. It is because the human eye has a 
vital connection with man's spiritual eye which is his intellect, his 
reason: the human eye is animated and exists by man's rational soul, the 
substantial form of his body. 
In the eye St. Thomas distinguishes two elementas the speciea impressa 
and the species expressa. 9 The proper object of the eye is the colored 
object. This is the formal object quod of the eye or that which the eye 
beholds first in its material object. But unless there be alight, that of 
the sun or that of a candle or that of electricity, the eye would not be 
able to see the colored subject matter; hence, the light is needed for that 
purpose. Accordingly, the light whereby the eye is enabled to see the 
formal object quod is called the formal object quo. When all these eondi-
9 Contra Gentiles, II, 73. 
Summa Theologiea, I, Q. 85, A. 1. 
Q. Disp. De Ver., Q. 4, A. 2. 
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tions are present, the seeing eye is impressed by the colored object con-
• fronting it. The result of this impression is the species expressa or the 
actual seeing of the object by the eye. This is the real sense intuition. 
The object confronting us is perceived at once and immediately, as though 
a seal had been taken and impressed on the wax, leaving its evident traces 
on the latter. In this way the whole universe and things in it may act 
upon the eye and leave in it their likenesses or images, not like the 
mechanical photographs but, as every Scholastic knows, certain vital and 
psychological likenesses and images that are taken up by the active intel-
lect and stored away in the passive intellect wherein they become part and 
parcel of our very being, vitally affecting us in one way or another with 
the resultant influence on our life and conduct. 
The question which arises in connection with the Thomistic species !!-
impressa, or image, likeness, similitude, intention, form (sp~cies, 
similitudo, intentio, forma) is this, That is really the object of our 
intuitive knowledge? Is it the cognitive image within us or the objective. 
reality outside of us? If the cognitive image is the object of our cog-
nition, then our knowledge of the things outside of us is not really 
immediate or presentative but representative or mediate, that is, we first 
see the image, the likeness, the similitude and then through it the object 
itself. In that case our cognition is no longer intuitive but reflective; 
one has to stop and think whether or not he is seeing only images or 
realities through them. But this is already the work of reason. The 
sentient faculties as such are unable to reflect and reason; they just see 
and comprehend things sentiently. To advocate representative or mediate, 
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cognition and perception is to open up a wide avenue into subjectivism and 
• idealism. And that is what the subjectivists and idealists always did. 
st. Thomas advocates the presentative or immediate, cognition and percep-
10 
tion. Hence for him it is the thing outside of us that is really the 
immediate ?bject of our cognition and perception. He speaks of the union 
of what is perceived with the perceiving sense and of the identification of 
the sensation with the thing perceived. He writes, "TWo things are ra-
quired both' for sensible and intellectual vision, viz., power of sight and 
union of the thing seen is in a certain way in seer." 11 He similarly 
speaks in his Summa Contra Gentiles when he says that !! ~ ~ visibli 
~ fit. 12 And in the Summa Theologica he once more writes, "The sense is 
simply a passive potena,r which is disposed by nature to be changed by an 
external sensible object. This external something that produces the change 
is what is apprehended by the sense." 13 St. Thomas is a perfect intui-
tionist in the domain of sense perceptions and cognitions and, consequently, 
is as great a realist as the greatest of the materialists, Moleschott, 
Buechner, Haeckel, Diderot, d'Alembert, Holbach, La Mettrie, Cabanis, and 
all the rest. 
The eye is the noblest of senses. St. Thomas speaks of two ld.nds of 
changes in the senses, one that is natural and the other that is tmmate-
rial. The first he discovers wherever the form of that producing the 
10 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 85, Art. 2. 
II Summa Theologiea, I. Q. 12, Art. 2. 
12 Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Chap. 51. 
13 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3 • 
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change is received in its natural state b,y that which is changed, as tor 
• 
instance, heat is received b,y that which is heated. The second he finds 
whenever a torm is received according to this immaterial being. He writes, 
uNow 1mmutation is ot two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural 
j.mmLltation takes place by the torm ot the immuter being received according to 
its natural existence into the thing 1mmuted, as the torm ot color is 
received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored." 14 An 
immaterial change is required tor the activity ot the senses because if a 
natural change alone were· sutticient, then every body that suttered change 
would perceive something, a tree would see the sun or truit hanging on its 
branchesl So St. Thomas writes, "For the operation ot the senses a spiri-
tuaJ. immutation is required, whereby an intention ot the sensible torm is 
atfected in the sensile organ. otherwise, 1£ a natural immutation alone 
sufficed tor the sensets action, all natural bodies would teel when they 
undergo alteration." 15 The ditterent senses arise from the tact that some 
of them experience pure~ immaterial changes whereas in others the changes 
are somewhat bound up with natural changes. To this etfect St. Thomas says, 
"But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in the sight, 
while in others we tind not o~ a spiritual but also a natural immutation, 
either on the part of the object only or likewise on the part of the 
organ. On the part ot the object we find natural immutation by alteration, 
in odor to exhale an odor, a body must be in measure affected by heat. 
On the part of the organ natural iJllDDltation takes place in touch 
14 SWJ11D8 Theologica, I. Q. ?S, Art. 3. 
15 ~., 
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and taste for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot while the 
• 
tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs 
of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by 
16 
any natural immutation unless indirectly." 
In the sense of sight the alteration or change is purely immaterial. 
For this reason the human eye is the noblest of the human senses. For 
which reason st. 'Ihomas says, "Now the sight which is without natural 
immutation either in its organ or in its object is the most spiritual, the 
most perfect, and the most universal of all senses." 17 
The next source of Thomistic sentient intuitive cognition is in the 
hearing. Here too must be species impressa and species expressa though 
they must be quite unlike the species impressa and the species expressa 
which are found in the eye since the organ of hearing is quite different 
from the organ of sight and the object of hearing, which is sound and quite 
different from the object of sight which is color or colored matter. What 
is the species impressa as regards the hearing? It is the sound caused, as 
st. Thomas says, by percussion and commotion of the air and striking the 
ear drum. Then the species expressa must be the actual hearing or percep-
tion of the sound. 
The bear seems to delight in music; the dog cannot stand the clap of 
thunder. Does a bear really appreciate music? Does a dog know the real 
danger in connection with a thunderstorm? No' The bear delights in music 
simply because it soothes his ear drum and the dog cannot stand the thunder 
16 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3. 
17 Ibid. 
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clap because it terribly hurts his ear drum. Man's ear alone can perceive 
• beauty in music and can hear the mighty forces of nature in a thunderstorm" 
revealing the might and power of nature's Author" those of God Himself. 
The rustling of leaves under the breath of gentle zephyrs" the how1ings of 
the mighty winds" the roarings of the angry sea" the music of Beethoven" 
the symphonies of Tschaikovsky" the sermon of the preacher" a conversation 
with one's fellow creatures" a mother's words on the ear of a child - all 
these are so many direct impressions on the human ear and then so many 
direct expressions conveyed to the sensus connnunis and then to the mind" to 
the heart" and to ~he soul to sway us in one way or anotherl These marvels 
come from intuitions perceived first by the ear. 
In degree of dignity the ear is next to the eye because of the imma-
teria1 change that takes place in its act of hearing though it requires" as 
st. Thomas says" "a natural imnnltation on the part of the object" sound 
caused by percussion and commotion of the air." 18 
The next source of intuition lies in the smell. The sense of smell if! 
given the animal for the sake of its individual good and that of its 
species. An animal smells food at a distance; so do we at times. Some 
animals smell their enemies at a distance and therefore make their escape in 
due time. For us there is the good odor of virtue and the awful odor of 
vice 1 The fragrance of a rose may convey to us the odor of sancti ty in the 
Little Flower. The intuitions connected with the sense of smell may pro-
duce many other intuitions of another kind for our own spiritual good and 
18 Summa. 'Iheo10gica, I. Q. 78" Art. 3. 
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that of our fellow creatures if we know how to profit by them. 
In degree of nobility the sense of smell comes next to the hearing. 
The physiologists describe the sense of smell as"the sense by which certain 
qualities of substances entering the nose are perceived." 19 
St. Thomas speaks of two kinds of changes in the senses - natural and 
immaterial. He writes, "immutation is two kinds, one nature, the other 
spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being 
received according to its natural existence into the thing immuted, as heat 
is received into the thing heated. ~bereas spiritual immutation takes 
place by the form of the immuter being received according to a spiritual 
mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is re-
ceived into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now for the 
operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required whereby an 
intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ." There-
wise if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all 
natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration. "But is some 
senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in sight; while in others we 
find not only a spiritual immutation, either on the part of the object only 
or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find 
natural immutation, as to place, in sound Which is the object of hearing 
for Bound is caused by percussion and communication of the air, and we find 
immutation by alteration in odor which is the object of smalling, for in 
19 Brubaker, Albert, B.D., LL.D., Textbook of Human Physiology, 
P. Elakiston's Son and Co., Philadelphia. 
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order to exhale an odor a body must be in a measure affected by heat." 
• 
Then classifYing the senses according to their dignity and nobility, 
st. Thomas writes, "Now the sight which is without natural immutation 
either in its organ or in its object is the most spiritual, the most per-
fect and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes hearing 
and then comes the smell which requires a natural immutation on the part of 
the object, while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, 
the motion of alteration as the Philosopher proves (Phys. VIII, 7.).0 21 
The next source of sentient intuitions is found in the sense of taste. 
Of the sense of taste St. Thomas writes, "The sense of taste according to 
a saying of the Philosopher is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. 
It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of 
touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only on account 
of the common formality of its object, we must say that taste is distin-
guished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation. For 
touch involves a natural and only a spiritual immutation in its organ by 
reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste 
is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality 
which is its proper object so that the tongue itself becomes sweet or 
bitter, but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to and on which is 
based the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch." 22 
The animal is endowed with it for the sake of its own preservation for 
20 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3 
21 rug. 
22 Summa The ologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3, ad 4. 
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it thereby Imows what food to eat or what not to eat. For us this sense may 
mean other intuitions. In the very act of eating we may be inspired with 
love or hatred. WitH love if we remember the poor and leave something for 
them~ with hatred if we keep everything for ourselves, unmindful of our 
less fortunate fellow creatures. Again in the act of enjoying food, we may 
pour forth our thanks to God for His bountiful 'gifts thus sanctifying our-
selves even by these lowly necessary acts or we may enjoy the gifts quite 
unmindful of their Giver thereby bringing ourselves to the level of ir-
rational beings and even placing ourselves below their level, since they do 
not possess the intellect to lmow such things; whereas we do possess it and 
should use it for the guidance of ourselves in all things. 
The next source of intuition is in the sense of touch. Of the sence 
of touch St. ,Thomas writes, "The sense of touch is generally one, but is 
divided into several specific senses and for this reason it extends to 
various contratieties, which senses, however, are not separate from one 
another in their organ but are spread through the whole body so that their 
distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the 
bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue but not in the whole body, so it is 
easily distinguished from touch." 23 Elsewhere of the sense of touch he 
writes, -rhe sense of touch which is the foundation of the other senses is 
more perfect in man than in any other animal, .3.nd for this reason man must 
have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all 
other animals in the interior sensitive powers as is clear from what we 
23 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 73,·Art. 3, ad 3. 
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bave said above (Q. 76, Art. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls 
.. 
sbort of the other animals in some of the exterior senses, thus of all 
animals he has the least sense of smell. For man of all animals needs the 
largest brain as compared to the body, both for his greater freedom of 
action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operation, as 
we have seen above (Q. 84, Art. 7), and in order that the low temperature 
of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable 
in man for him to be able to stand up erect. So that the size of the brain, 
by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell which requires 
dryness. In the same way we may suggest a reason why some animals have a 
keener sight and a more acute hearing than man, namely, on account of a 
hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equality of 
his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why soma animals are 
more rapid in movement than man since this excellence of speed is incon-
sistent with the equality of the human temperament." 24 
Particularly the sense of touch in the human hand does St. Thomas 
extol I With Aristotle he calls it tithe tool of tools." He writes, "Horns 
and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide 
and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are 
the signs of an abundance of earthly element, which does not agree with the 
equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do 
not suit the nature of man. Instead of these he has reason and hands where-
by he can make himself arms and clothes and other necessaries of life, of 
24 Summa Theologica J I. Q. 91, Art. 3, ad 1. 
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infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle the organ of 
--. -
,Q.!'gans.n 25 
The sense of touch is a very great source of intuitions. Its species 
~ressae and species expressae ar~ effected by contact. The physiology book 
defines the sense of touch as "the sensa by which pressure or traction on 
the skin or mucous membrane is perceived." 26 That is mat st. Thomas 
also teaches. For him the senses are intermediaries between the knowing 
consciousness and the external world. He writes, "the reason of the number 
and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that 
which belongs to the senses properly and per~. Now, sense is a passive 
power and is naturally inmruted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the 
exterior causes are the sensitive powers diversified." Z7 For him the sense 
28 
of touch is, as we knO'Vl, the basic sense and consequently bound up with 
the very preservation of the individual's life. The touch coming into 
immediate contact with the texture of the outside world keeps the animal 
informed about it and enables it to ward off any perniciOUS and destruc-
tive influence. The infant in the mother's womb, before the infusion of 
the rational soul, feels mostly by the sense of touch. 29 This shows hmv 
vitally and inti~~ely the sense of touch is connected with the individual 
preservation, as well as that of the species. One can be blind, and deaf, 
25 Summa Theologiea, I. Q. 91, Art. 3, ad 2. 
26 Textbook of Human PhysiolOgy, op, cit. 
'Z7 Summa Theologics, I. Q. 78, Art. 3. 
28 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 91, Art. 3, ad 1. 
29 Summa Theologica, III, Q. 34, Art. 2, ad 3. 
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lose the sense of smell, and even taste, and still live ••• but if numbness 
.. 
comes over a body, that is a sign that death is near at handl 
st. Thomas accords the sense of touch a special importance in view of 
the rational element, life and activity in man. He believes that this 
sense in him conditions the endowments of his mind. He writes, "All the 
other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch 
requires to be a medium between contraties, such as hot and cold, wet and 
dry, and the like of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it 
is in potentiality with regard to contraries and is able to perceive them. 
Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equitable complexion, 
the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the 
power of sense in all its completeness because what belongs to the inferior 
nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says: 30 
Therefore the body to which intellectual soul is united should be a mixed 
body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason 
among animals man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who 
have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. J. sign of which 
is that we observe those who !!:!. refined in body!!!! '!!.Y. endowed in mind, 
31 
as stated in De ~, n, 9. In animals the sense of touch is ordained 
solely to the preservation of the individual life and to that of the 
species. But in man the sense of touch is also a tremendous source of 
sense intui tiona for the work of the mind. The first object of our 
30 Div. Nom. v. 
31 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 76, Art. 5. 
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intellect in this life is not &IV' being or an.y truth but it is being and 
. . 
truth in material things from which the human mind goes torward to the 
knoWledge of other things." 32 Again, "It is n.atural to man to attain to 
intellectual truths through sensible objects because all our knowledge 
originates trom sanse. Hence in Ho~ Writ spiritual truths are .fittingly 
taught under the likeness of material things." 33· 
The sense of touch which is the foundation ot the rest of the senses 
cannot but be a mighty source of intuitions from which the mind can lift 
out higher spiritual contents. In these sentient intuitions we can 
apprehend spiritual values and thence arise to the higher place of life. 
Particularly in DIlsic the sense of touch plays a tremendous role. The ~ano, 
the organ, the violin, would be useless instruments without the sense of 
human touch. Nor could other liberal arts, like sculpture, painting or 
architecture be realized without it. Our very speech could not .function 
without this sense. Hence we mst say that the intuitions afforded us by 
the sense of touch are many and most important for us in our every day lite", 
as well as for our civilization and the uplift of our souls. 
As for the internal senses, there is the common sense (sensus 
communis). It is a great source of intuitions because of the fact that it 
perceives at once and immediately 'What all the rest of the senses perceive 
singly. For instance, when one plays the piano, he sees this instrument, 
touches it, and hears the msic. He perceives all this immediately and 
distinctly by the sensus communis that is in him. So there he has three 
33 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 1, Art. 9 • 
.. 
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different intuitions at once. And one can have therein as many intuitions 
as the rest of his senses can revive by confronting their proper or common 
objects respectively. The animal's common sense serves it just for the 
preservation of its individual life and that of its species. For us, how-
ever, the common sense is an inexhaustible mine of intuitions. The intel-
lect with its own eye may see in them a 'World all of its own or a world 
belonging to God with all its beauty, goodness, righteousness, mercy. The 
sensus communis in itself is a marvel of nature's work and God's creation. 
Through its intuitions it can introduce us into the domain of other marvels 
in that same nature and His creation. The sensus communis radiates, as it 
were, intuitions; at first it perceives intuitions, then it unifies and 
distinguishes them and finally radiates them. 
The next internal sense is the phantasy or imagination which is the 
faculty that preserves the sense intuitions or contents and forms and renews 
them. It is the treasury that contains the forms begotten by the external 
senses. It transmits to the appetitive faculty the representation of that-
which is not present and it makes dreaming possible. St. Thomas writes, 
"For the retention and preservation of these forms (he naans sensible forms), 
the phantesy or imagination is appointed, which are the sam, for phantasy 
or imagination is, as it were, a storehouse of forms received through the 
senses." 34 Phantasy or imagination in man can be a perennial source of 
intuitions. Out of it the intellect and reason can produce poetry, music 
and other liberal arts; out of it one can draw inspiration for great and 
34 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 4. 
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noble deeds. One will be convinced of this truth if he studies great 
masterpieces 1n poetry, music, and other liberal arts. 
What are the species impressae and the species expressae in phantasy 
or imagination? They are no longer like the !Fecies impressae and species 
expressae in the external senses and even, perhaps, like those of the 
sensus oommunis, the direot presentations of the world outside of us but the 
indirect representations of it. Th~ sense contents are not only preserved 
here, as already mentioned, but they are also formed and renewed. So here 
a new element enters into the sense intuitions, namely, the subjective 
element founded on representation. Is it a subjectivism? No! This is 
simply a psychological element in the sense intuitions introduced from the 
outside by direct presentation of the external world. 
The next source of internal intuitions lies in the cogitative faculty. 
In brute animals the corresponding faculty is called estimative whereby' they 
know the harmfulness or the utility of a thing. St. Thomas calls it animal 
prudence or judgment. To this effect he writes, "Some things there are 
which act not from any previous judgment but, as it were, moved and made to 
act by others, just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. 
Others act from some kind of judgment, but not from free will, for sheep 
flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurt-
ful to itself. Such a judgment is not a free one but implanted by nature.,,35 
Again, "The estimative acts womswhat after the manner of reason." 36 And 
35 Summa 'lheo10gica. I. Q. 59, Art. 3. 
36 Book of Sentences, III, D. 26, Q. 1, Art. 2. 
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again, nThe young ravens are said to call upon God on account of the 
natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire to attain 
the Divine Goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God on account 
37 
of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God." 
st. Thomas writesa 
"Now we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no 
difference between man and other animals, for they are 
similarly i_ted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a 
difference as to the above intentions for other animals per-
ceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while 
man perceives them by means of collation of ideas. Therefore, 
the power which in other animals is called the natural 
estimative, in man is called ~he cogitative, which by some 
sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is 
called also the particular reason to which medical men assign 
a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the 
head for it compares individual intentions, just as the intel-
lectual reason compares universal intentions." 38 
That in the cogitative we are still in the domain of sense intuitions is 
evident from the fact that this particular reason apprehends things without 
much ado, almost instinctively, and therefore at once and immediately. The 
mother, for instance, at once apprehends the needs of her child and at once 
attends to them. So we all at once and immediately see what is of benefit 
to us in our daily life as well as what would be detrimental and act 
accordingly. 
The next and the last source of sentient intuition is the m.emorative 
faculty. Its function is to recognize the past. Hence its contents are 
sense impressions and expressions from the past. St. Thomas writes: 
37 Summa Theologica, 2-2, Q. 89, Art. 10, ad 3. 
38Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 4. 
"As to the memorative power, man has not only memory as 
other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past,· 
but also reminiscense by syllogistically, as it were, 
seeking for a recollection of the past by the application 
of individual intentions." 39 
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By analyzing the senses and their intuitive contents we have laid the 
ground for the intellective intuitions in man. How St. Thomas will leave 
this ground and find himself in the midst of the lofty intellective intui-
tions will be our next problem to consider. ~ would like to take along 
with us William James and the rest of the Sensists, Materialists, Posi-
tivists and show them how St. 1homas "flies," but will they profit by his 
example? It seems they are more content to be in the domain of what is 
• 
common between us and brute animals than in that of what is common between 
us and the angels, nay, God Himself. To be sura, brute animals have no 
real intuitions, even of the sentient order, since they are incapable of 
looking into or looking at things (which is the connotation of tm word 
intuition and wherein a certain ldnd of participation in the higher faculty, 
that is, the intellect is implied) but are impelled and driven thereto, so' 
to speak, by their instinct, and so St. 1homas says that the animals a.re 
more acted upon than acting themselves. (Magis aguntur quam agunt.) In 
man, because of the substantial union between his rational soul and material 
body, the latter, with all its senses, organs and sense faculties shares in 
the spirituality of the former. And so in virtue of this participated, so 
to speak, spirituality, man's sense impressions and expressions are intui-
tions, whereas those of brute animals are not. The materialist, sensists, 
39 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 78, Art. 4. 
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positivists, empiricists by denying the immateriality and spirituality of 
• 
the human soul destroy the real character of sense intuitions and thereby 
identif.1 them with the sense impressions and expressions of the brute 
animal nature. 
An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, be-
cause the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring 
necessaries- of life for which they are bestowed on the animals, but also 
for the purpose of knowledge. Hence whereas the other animals take delight 
in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone 
takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. There-
fore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have 
the face turned to the ground, as it were, for the purpose of seeking food 
and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect in order that 
by the senses and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates 
further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible 
objects around him, both heavenly and earthly so as to gather intelligible-
truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of 
the interior powers - the brain wherein these acts are, in a way performed, 
not being low dawn but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, 
because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his 
hands as forefeet and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. 
Fourthly, because if manrs stature were prone to the ground and he used his 
hands as forefeet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his 
mouth and thus be would have a protn~ding mouth with thick and bard lips 
and also a hard tongue so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things, 
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as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would qui\e hinder 
speech which is reason's proper operation. 
Nevertheless though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For 
man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the 
world and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world, and there-
fore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of the body. 
Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their 
roots correspond to the mouth and their inferior part towards the upper 
world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part 
of the animal is that by which it takes food and the inferior part that by 
which it rids of the superior. 40 Hence man's erect position itself makes 
him a commanding figure in the field of intuitions and enables him to gain 
them with ease 
40 SUlIll'lla Theolog,i. ca t I. Q. 91, Art. 3, ad 3. 
CHAP~ IV 
l;NTELLECTUAL INTUITION IN ST. THOMAS 
The late G. K. Chesterton in his introduction to Dr. Fulton J. Sheen's 
bood God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy writes: 
"I remember a romance of rambling but rather interesting 
sort which came out in one of the strange and sensational 
series that used to be produced by the late W. T. Stead. 
It began with the incident of a modern sceptical heroine 
going into a confessional box and telling the priest that 
she did not believe in his religion. He asked her what 
she did believe in and she said reflectively, 'Well, I 
don't believe in the Bible, and I don't think I believe in 
the immortality of the soul, and I'm not sure that I believe 
in God, and so on.' And the unmoved cleric replied, 'I 
didn't ask you what you don't believe, but what you do 
believe.' 'Well,' said the lady, 'I believe that two and 
two make four"i 'Very well, then,' said the priest, 'live 
up to that.,n 
Why was the lady in question so certain about the truth that two and two 
make four while she was doubting or completely rejecting those higher 
truths, by no means less but much more certain than the mathematical truth 
she took from the table of multiplication? The reason is that the truths 
contained in the Bible, God's existence, as well as the immortality of the 
soul belong to the domain of reflective truths at the possession of which 
1 Sheen, Fu.lton J., God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy, Lagman, 
Green and Company, London, 1935. 
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one can arrive only after a long course of profound reflective and· 
discursive studies. The Bible, for instance, may be known by heart in 
the light of reason but one will not believe the truths and ~steries 
contained in it unless he is given the light of faith and divine aid 
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from above. But the mathematical truth that two and two make four is 
evident ~ ~ so that hardly any reflection is needed to grasp it, it 
simply forces itself upon our mind as it did force itself on the mind of 
the unbelieving lady mentioned above. We cannot but accept the truth, 
else we are no longer in our sound mind, or we are simply relying on 
our sense intuitions when there is no proper adaptation between out 
senses and their objects, thus, if two parallel lines be pro~onged, they 
seem to meet at a distance because of the lack of proper adjustment between 
them at that point and our eye or may be that organ is not in a normal 
and healthy condition; thus, to a person laid up with typhoid fever, even 
the sweetest things are most bitter. And in that case intuition, instead 
of being according to reason, are simply contrary to reason. Of such 
intui tions there are very many instances in PIa to's philosophy, wherein 
he claims the universals in the world of Ideas or Forms; in Descartes' 
philosophy in which he intuitively sees that he thinks and that 
consequently he exists even while doubting the very power to think and 
to exist; in all subsequent materialistic and idealistic 
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philosophies wherein the modern sages after having erred about the real 
nature of man, the substantial union between his rational soul and body, 
could not but err in all their intuitions about him and everything else. 
Berkeley beholds, only spirit in matter and Cabanis only a secretion of 
the brain in thought. All such philosophers are no longer able to see 
with certainty that two and two make four for in their cases the parallel 
lines meet and they say with Ibsen, "Who knows that two and trro do not make 
five in the fixed stars?" 2 Being off the tangent, those philosophers are 
unable to coms back to the first principles, the principle of identity, the 
principle of contradiction, and the principle of excluded middle in order to 
verify, rectify, or readjust, or even renounce altogether their intuitions, 
sentient or otherwise, in the light of irrefragable and eternally true 
principles on which all certitude and truth must stand, else there can be 
no falsehood, lie, while the wiseacres are striving to bestow on them the 
semblance of truth and certainty. For St. 'Ihomas there is nothing in the 
intellect unless it goes first through the senses. Once this'process has 
been realized, he bases the sense intuitions on the intellective intui-
tions on the intellective intuitions. What are these in the teachings of 
st. Thomas? 
Once more we must note what is meant by intuition. Intuition is a 
cognition of an object outside of ~se1f. Intuition is an accident. Hence 
it is inherent in me, in ~ ego. So there is the external object on the 
one side and there I am ~se1f on the other, and the intuition is the bond 
2 God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy, OPe cit. 
.. 
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of union between us, the outside world and my own ego. The external object 
stands out betore us and we see it just as it is or impresses itself upon 
us, upon our senses, and then upon our intellect, as is truly the case with 
the intellective intuition. We see the object in question in consequence 
ot the expressed species it leaves in us, through which we assimilate it 
(object), so to sepak, and become one with it, of which assimilation and 
union we have already spoken in connection with sense intuitions. Hence 
intuition from the Latin verb, intueri, means to look at a thing atten-
tively because it seizes, as it were, our cognitive faculty and we compre-
hend it by the same faculty so that we become lost in this mutual embrace, 
if one may speak so. 
I see a friend and recognize him. And yet St. Thomas teaches that -the 
intellect knows sensible individual things only indirectly and by a kind of 
reflection. It 3 This seems to militate against the very notion of intui-
tion since its chief trait is that of direct and immediate cognition. Hence 
even if I see my friend standing before me with my bodily eyes, directly 
and immediately, still I cannot see him directly and immediately nth the 
eye of my mind. How are we to solve the difficulty? , St. Thomas speaks of 
this problem in connection with the intellect's cognition of individual 
objects on two occasions in the M! Veritate and in the Summa Theologica. 
Once the intellect has come to know its own object which is the 
universal essence, it turns then to obtain the species which is 
the universal essence; it turns then to obtain SOmB knowledge 
of its awn act and after that it goes farther to obtain the 
3De Veritate, II, Q. 6. Art. 2. 
species which is the principle of its act, and then it looks 
at the phantasm from which it has abstracted the species a~d 
thus it obtains the knowledge of the individual. 4 
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Similarly he speaks of the process in the Summa Theo10gica, except that he 
does not mention the intellect's reflection on its own act. As we see, there 
is in both instances the reflective knowledge and not a direct and immed-
iate cognition as the intuition should be •. Are we, then, to say that we 
possess no intuitive knowledge of our friends, nor that of our brothers, 
sisters, parents? To say so would mean to deny easy and spon~aneous intel-
lective intuitions of this kind in our daily lives and intercourse with our 
fellowman and especially with our own folks. Wherefore, despite those 
apparent difficulties, we must maintain that we possess with certainty such 
intuitive cognitions on the ground of our previous contact, intercourse, 
experience, and living with all such persons. We have acquired a happy 
faculty or habit of knowing them in virtue of which we unmistakably recog-
nize them at once in the midst of the individualizing notes and traits of 
their personalities. We know in general what is meant by goodness, truth-· 
iulness, honesty, justice, mercy and the like. We have gained these uni-
versal concepts from the concrete persons - our awn folks, friends, ac-
quaintances, whose goodness, honesty, righteousness we experienced before 
and now we intuitively recognize them by these qualities. 
There is what is called the post-rational intuition, a result of the 
"habit of knowledge." Let us remember the twofold character of our mind-
analytic and synthetic. We do not know things at once and immediately in 
4 De Veritate. II, Q. 6. Art. 2. 
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their entirety. First, we tear them apart, we analyze them, we examine 
them part by part, and then we join the parts together which is the work of 
synthesis in order to know them in their totality. 50 in acquiring 
sciences and knowledge we analyze, abstract, reason, and finally arrive at 
the conclusions which we store in our passive intellects, and which eventu-
ally become the Uhabit of knowledge" with l.!S. We see scientific truths in 
them spontaneously, so to speak, at once and immediately. To the class of 
these postrational intuitions belong also the intellective intuitions we 
have of our friends, acquaintances, our own folks and the rest; our daily 
experience with these persons taught us to Know them and to acquire "the 
habit" of knowing them. They may be called the post-experiental intuitions. 
In all these instances, the spontaneous, ~ immediate knowledge of the 
individual is concomitant ~ ~ immediate knowledge of ~ universal. 
This solves the problem of the intellective intuition in question. And of 
such similar intuitions there are countless instances in every man, woman, 
and child, in every scientist, artist, and artisan, in every philosopher, 
metaphysician, and theologian. They all have them. 
However, all such intuitions are possible and 2[ facto exist because 
of the so-called fundamental intellective intuitions. What are we to under-
stand thereby? It is the seeing by the intellect of its own proper object 
which is being. Just as the eye has its own proper object, the ear its own, 
and the rest of the senses, their own, so the intellect has its own proper 
and per ~ object and this is, as just mentioned, being. 
But how does the intellect come to the perception of its own object in 
this fundamental intuition? Quite simply and naturally. It comes thereto 
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by means of abstraction from the sense data or the sentient perceptions and 
• 
intuitions. The eye brings in the colored objects, the ear the sounds, the 
touch the extension, and the other senses something else, until their 
contributions through the perceptions and functions of the internal senses 
have accumulated in the imaginative faculty, from which the intellectus 
agens abstracts the notion of being and the intellectus patiens understands 
that whatever is, is and that whatever is not, is not and that there can be 
no middle course between being and non-being. In this way a tremendous 
leap is taken from the sense data into the domain of pure metaphysics, even 
by the lowliest and most ignorant people for they all know what is to be 
• and what is not to be, or what is to live and what is not to live, that is, 
to die. The animals perceive this too but with them it is not abstraction 
of the intellectus agens and the understanding of the intellectus patiens, 
but the instinct which forces them to seek self-preservation and to flee 
from death. They are in no way able to rise above this animal instinct and 
to die, let us say, a heroic death for the sake of one's own country and . 
... ~ frl:fl't~~ 
say with Horace, Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. (It is swee~ to die 
.. 
for one's own country.) 
In De Magisti'ro st. Thomas writes: 
"We must recognize that there is this difference between the 
intellect and bodily sight; to bodily sight all its objects 
are equally immediate for knowing for the sense is not a 
discursive power as to be obliged from one of its objects to 
arrive at another; but to the intellect not all intelligible 
things are equally immediate for knOwing, but certain things 
it sees immediately and certain other things it does not see 
except by examining other principles. Thus then man gains 
a knowledge of unknown through these two, namely, the intel-
lective light and the first concepts intuitively known which 
are compared to the light of the active intellect, as tools 
to a builder. With regard to both, God is the cause of 
mants knowledge in the most excellent way possible, because. 
he endows the mind itself with the intellective light and 
impresses on it the knowledge of first principles, which are 
as certain germs of knowledge just as He impresses on other 
natural things, the germinal capacities of all the effects 
to be produced. But man being equal according to the order 
of nature to other men in the kind of intellective light, 
can in no way be the cause of knowledge in another man by 
increasing the light in him. But in view of the fact that 
knowledge is known, man is, in a way, the cause of another's 
knowing not by giving the knowledge of principles but by 
deducing into actuality that which is implicitly and in a 
certain way potentially contained in sense, as has been 
said in the preceding article. But because an angel has 
naturally a more perfect intellective light than man, he 
can be the cause of knowing in man in both ways, although 
in an inferior way than God is the cause and in a superior 
way than man is. If 5 
81 
In the above quoted passage st. Thomas states the fact that we possess 
sentient intuitions given to us by our senses, on the one hand, and intel-
lective intuitions engendered in us by the first principle, on the other, 
and that between these two classes of intuitions there is the discursive 
knowledge obtained by analysis and syntheSis, by induction and deduction, 
by a process from certain premises to corresponding conclusions. Further, 
st. Thomas states therein that God is the cause of our knowledge in the 
most excellent way because He gives us the intellective light and'''impresses 
on it knowledge: From these different statements of the Angelic Doctor, we 
see how he based all cognitions on the first principles. Our sense cogni-
tions, discursive knowledge, lights received from above, from God or an 
angel, must be reduced to the first principles and judged in the light of 
those fundamental intuitions if we are to possess certain cognitions at all 
5 De Magistro, Art. 3. 
I 
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and not simply unverified intuitions of the modern type to lImch one may 
• 
well apply the name of Bacon's different idols - idols of the tribe, idols 
of the den, idols of the market place, idols of the theatre, and which lead 
us but to errors, absurdities, contradictions, in all our endeavors and 
spheres of life, material, spiritual, moral, scientific, philosophic, and 
every other. 
St. Thomas speaks of the intuitions furnished by the first principles 
elsewhere. In the Summa Theologica he states that the first principles in 
order of cognition, as ~ll as in that of ethics, are the unyielding 
principles of knowledge, as well as of desire and action. He writes: 
"The intellect cannot but assert to principles naturally 
known; and the will cannot but seek good, insofar as it is 
good because it is naturally ordained to good as its object." 6 
The first principle in the domain of cognition is that of contradiction. 
The same thing cannot be and not be at the saIll8 time and in the same 
respect (Non contingit idem sirnul esse et non esse); and in the domain of 
things moral the first principle is thisJ Good is to be done and evil to 
be avoided (Bonum est prosequendum; malum vero est fugiendum.)7 Again the 
first principles are the most certain and secure grounds of our knowledge 
in the speculative order of things and of our actions in the practical 
order of life. Hence per!! no error is possible on the ground of these 
principles. However, if there be an error about them, the error arises not 
directly from them but is contained in the conclusion badly drawn by a 
faulty reasoning. (Intellectus errat circa prima principia, in specula-
6 Summa Theologica. I. Q. 62, Art 8 and 2. 
7 Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 94, ad 2; II-II, Q. 1, ad 7. 
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. . tivis et in practicis ut sunt virtute in conclusionibus, per mal~~ ratlo-
cinationem, non autem secundum se). And the error about the first 
principles, whether in the speculative or the practical order of things 
is most serious and most shameful. (Error circa principia in 
speculativis et in practicis, est gravissimus et turpissiwus.) 8 All 
scientific certainty can be verified by referring to the first principla 
of contradiction, of excluded middle term, of sufficient reason, and all 
science is contained in them germinally and potentially for which reason 
these universally known and immediately evident principles, though small 
in extent, are ver,y great in power. 
It is in this light that St. Thomas speaks of the first principles 
in De Veritate, Contra Gentiles, and Summa Theologica. 9 Hos whole 
system of philosophy is grounded on these princip19s. On the first 
pri~ciples he bases all cO&Tition in the speculative order of things and 
all rorali.ty in the practical order. 
We obtain knowledge of the first prinCiples by an immediate act of 
8 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12. 
9 De Veritate, XV, 1; XVI, 1 
Contra Gentiles, I, 61. 
Summa Theologica, I. ~. 2, Art. l:Q. 62, Art. 1, ad 2. 
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intuition. (Simplex et absoluta acceptio principii per se noti.) 10 Hence 
fundamental intellective intuition is the groundwork for all true cognition, 
art, sCience, philosophy and theology in the speculative order of things 
and for all ethics and morality in the practical domain of human life. 
There are two orders of truth, the speculative and the practical. In 
the speculative order where the notion of being is the first of all notions, 
the first indemonstrable principle is that of contradiction whereby we 
affirm that a being is or is not. Accordingly, in the practical order where 
the first notion is that of good (for every agent acts for an end and wills 
a good), the first principle is that which affirms that good must be sought 
and evil avoided. (Bonum est faciendum et malum vitandum.) Hence St. 
Thomas writes s 
"The precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason 
what the first principles of demonstration are to the specu-
lative reason because both are self-evident principles ••• a 
certain order to be found in those things that are apprehended 
universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under 
apprehenSion is being, the notion of which is included in all 
things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first in-
demonstrable prinCiple is that the ~ thing cannot be 
affirmed and demied at the ~ time. which is based on the 
notion of being and not being. and on this principle all 
others are based... Now as being is the first thing that 
falls under the apprehension of the practical reason which 
is directed to action since every agent acts for an end 
under the aspect of good. Consequently, the first principle 
in the practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, 
viz., that good !! ~ which all things seek after. Hence 
this is the first precept of law, that good !!. ~ be done !!E. 
evil ~ be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law 
are bases upon this so that whatever the practical reason 
naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the 
precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided." 11 
10 Summa Theologica, Q. 180, Art. 6, ad 2. 
11 Summa Theologies, I-II, Q. 94, .Art. 9. 
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From the above doctrine it necessarily follows that just as there is 
the intuitive knowledge in connection with the habit of the first princi-
pIes in the speculative order, there must also be the intuitive knowledge 
of the first principles in the order of practical reason, in that of ethics. 
This is done by the intuitive knowledge called synderesis or synteresis. 
This word comes from the Greek language meaning a close watching. In 
virtue of the synderesis, the mind does not employ the major and the minor, 
and consequently, does not draw a conclusion from the premises; it watches 
and sees at once and immediately what must be done as something good and 
avoided as something evil. This is an intellective knowledge, par excel-
lence, of the practical reason. St. Thomas speaks of it as followsl 
"Synderesis is not a power but a habit; though some held that 
it is a power higher than reason, while others said that it 
is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order 
to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above, 
man t s act of reasoning since it is a kind 0 f movement, pro-
ceeds from the understanding of certain things, namely, those 
which are naturally known without any investigation on the 
part of reason, as from an immovable principle and ends also 
a t the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles 
naturally known, we judge those things which we have discovered 
by reasoning. It is clear that as the speculative reason 
argues about speculative things, so the practical reason 
argues about practical things. Therefore, we must have be-
stowed on us by natura not only speculative principles but also 
practical principles. Now the first speculative principles 
bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but 
to a special habit which is called the understanding of 
principles as the Philosopher explains.12 Wherefore, the first 
practical principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to 
a special power but to a special natural habit which we call 
synderasis. Whence, synderesis is said to incite to good and 
to murmur to evil inasmuch as through first principles we 
proceed to discover and judge of what we have discovered. It 
is, therefore, clear that synderesis is not a power but a 
natural habit ... 13 
12 Ethic., VI, 6. 
13 Aristotle, Nichornachean Ethics, Ross Edition, Clarendon Press, 1890 
Book IV, Chapter SO. 
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But is this natural habit, synderesis, "inciting to good and murmuring 
.. 
at evil" which is contrary to the CD nscience commending us for our good 
deeds and reproaching us for the evil ones? True, they are not to be 
identified synderasis, which may be quite easily taken for suneidesis 
(joint knowledge), that is, conscience. In fact some writers, like St. 
Jerome and later St. Bonaventure, saw no difference between them. However, 
St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and others distinguish them. For them synderesis 
is a habit, something permanent; suneidesis or conscience is an inter-
mittent act. In virtue of gynderesis, I, at once and immediately, almost 
spontaneously, know that parents must ~ honored. I must honor them, 
respect them, and' help them in every way I can. However, if I fail to do 
so, my conscience will reproach rna for this. And if I fail in my duty 
toward my parents continously, my conscience will bother me also continu-
ously, unless it be entirely deadened by ~ evil deeds. Still this constant 
reproach (or constant commendation if I am a dutiful daughter) will not 
cause my conscience to become a synderesis for me by the very fact that 
conscience commends or reproaches in virtue of szgder6sis. In other words, 
conscience has no light of its own; it is guided by synderesis. Hence 
St. Thomas writes: 
"Properly speaking, conscience is not a power but an act. 
This is evident both from the very name and form those 
things which in the common way of speaking are attributed 
to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature 
of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something, 
for conscience may be resolved into ~alio sciencia, i.e_, 
knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application 
of lmowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore, 
from this explanation of the name, it is clear that 
conscience is an act. 
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liThe same is manifest from those things which are attributed 
to conscience. F'or conscience is said to witness, to bind,. 
or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. All 
these follow the application of knowledge or conscience to 
what we do; which application is made in three ways. One 
way, insofar as we recognize that we have done or not done 
something - Thy conscience knoweth ~ thou ~ often 
spoken evil of others (Eccles., VII, 23), and according to 
this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, inso-
far as through the conscience we judge that something 
should be done or not done; and in this sense, consciou$ 
is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, insofar as 
by conscience we judge that something done is well or ill 
done and in this sense, conscience is said to excuse, 
accuse, or torment. Now it is clear that all these things 
follow the actual application of Imowledge to' what we do. 
~berefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act 
since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name 
conscience is given to the first natural habit, namely, 
s deresis thus Jerome calls synderesis, conscience. 
Glos s. Eze ch. i, 6); Basil, that natural power of judgment., 
and Damascene says that it is the law £! 2Er intellect. For 
it is customary. for causes and effects to be called after 
one another." 14 
SJ~deresis and conscience are the two great source of intuition in 
the moral order of things. A profound study and exploration of these 
sources cannot but be of the greatest benefit to individuals themselves and 
to society at large. 
14 Summa Theologiea, I. Q. 79, Art. 13. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ancient philosopher, Empedoclas, claimed that like is known by 
like, " ••• earth by earth, water by water, fire by fire," and so on. This 
is the principle on which the moderns base their intuition, even though, 
perhaps, they are not aware of the fact that they are doing so. Take for 
example, the prince of modern intuitionists, Bergson. For him there are no 
intuitions in the Thomistic sense, be they of the sentient or those of the 
intellective order. For him there is no passive phase of intuition as there 
is for St. Tnomas by the very fact that the things impress themselves upon 
our senses, or the first principles on our mind; there is only active intui-
tion since he maintains that we become aware of the nature of reality 
through direct experience, only insofar as we enter into the reality in 
question, from a part of it, and interpret it through a kind of sympathy by 
becoming earth, water, fire, or anything else. This he calls true intui-
tion and creative evolution wherein the chief eiement is the elan vital -
the vi tal impulse. The underlying idea in this kind of intuition is truly 
that of Empedocles. The new element in it is that of becoming. The ground 
of all things is becoming since the creative vital process is at once the 
reality and moving principle of individual life and of the cosmos as a 
whole, whereof we ourselves are part and parcel in this total cosmic 
movement. F'or this reason, we are no longer free in the light of Bergson's 
philosophy, even though he undertook to vindicate the freedom of man in 
88 
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opposition to other modern philosophic systems wherein not even the vetiges 
of his freedom have been left. We are in the process of becoming more and 
more one with the things about us, with the world/with the universe. 
Bergson's sympathetic intuitions and that of other modern intuitionists 
identify man with what he sees, hears, perceives, and so with the rest of 
his senses and his intellect itself. Therefore, the condition sine gua !!Q!! 
of modern intuition is one's becoming identified with the world and then 
one's continuing to evolve with it. On this becoming and continuing is 
basett the modern theory of knowledge which may be stated thus, Becoming 
is known Ex. becoming and continuing is known bI. continui t;y-. Such is 
modern intuition and this is a degradation of manl In what sense? In this 
that he must identify himself with creatures lower than himself and by 
sympathetic intuition become like unto them, forfeiting thus his freedom, 
his moral dignity and making himself the slave of things material. This is 
an inversion and perversion of the o~er established b.1 the Creator. 
st. Thomas' intuition is radically different from that of the moderns. 
In his intuition man does not become one with things but things beco~B one 
with him by means of the cognitive assimilation, first in his senses, then 
in his intellect. In this way things material, the cosmos, become ennobled 
by the quality of his mind and he himself becomes enriched by the impres-
sions and ideas he acquires from the outside world since they become a part 
and parcel of ',him in the external 'World as in the case of modern intuition. 
St. Thomas conveys the idea of the order of human cognition in the follow-
ing 1'IOrds: "Matter receives the form that thereby it may be continued in 
some species either in air or of fire or of something else; but the intel-
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lect does not receive the fom in the same way, otherwise ·the opinion of 
Empedocles (De Anima, 1, 5, Text 26) would ~ true to the effect that we 
1mow earth by earth and fire by fire. But, the intelligible form is in the 
intellEict according to the VEiry nature of a form for as such is it so known 
by the intellect. Hence SIlch a way of receiving is not that of matter but 
of an immaterial substance." 1 
For the modern intuitionists, the sense ~ are a source of degrada-
tion and enslavement, whether they want or not. They are led thereto by 
the inexorable law of logic for if one enters into the sense data and 
identifies himself with creatures by the bond of sympathy for them (Whatever 
sympathy this may be), one is bound to become like unto them and thereby to 
lose himself in them. For St. Thomas the sense data are the source whence 
there arises the sentient intuition from which, by means of abstraction, he 
comes to the intellective intuitions. From the intellective intuitions he 
rises, by means of discursive knowledge, to the domain of such metaphysical 
truths as being, act, and potency, substance and accident, God's existence, 
His divine attributes, His providence in the world, the immortality of man's 
soul, life beyond the grave, sanction of the law whereby evil must be 
punished and good must be rewaroed, and the like. 
The sentient intuitions, rightly understood, inevitably lead to the 
intellective intuitions. First of all, they lead to the intuitive knowl-
edge of the first principles. st. 1homas states that the intellect mows 
nothing but being which, in general, deSignates everything that exists or 
1 Sununa 'llleologica, I, Q. 50, Art. 2, ad 2. 
I 
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may exist, whether it be a substance, a~ accident, a material tr~ng, or an 
.. 
immaterial one, again, there are contingent beings, as all creatures are, 
or the Necessary Being, that is, God. Hence the formal reason of our 
comprehending anything is that of its being. This also applies to the 
transcendental properties of being - unum, verum, bonum, a1iquid, indivisum. 
In Quaest, Disp. De Verit., Art. 1, St. Thomas writes: 
I~bat the intellect first apprehends as something most 
evident and into which it reduces all its conceptions, 
is being. The true and being differ conceptually in this 
that what is in the concept of the true is not in the 
concept of being but not in such a way that what is in 
the notion of being is not in the notion of the true." 2 
But how does our intellect comprehend being? Is it in its own essence 
as the angels do in theirs, or as God does in His? No, the proper object 
of the human intellect, the ratio entis (the very notion of being), is 
derived from sense but, of course, it is abstract and universal. The very 
substantial union between man's soul and body postulates such a course and 
there is for us no other way of possessing intellective knowledge of things 
in this life. Hence it follows that what we first apprehend from the data 
of sense perceptions, in other words, from the perceptive intuitions of 
our senses, is the notion of being and then that of non-being. This is 
done most easily and quite spontaneously from the ver,y comprehension of 
terms or language conveying such notions. And so through the medium of 
our perceptive intuitions, we acquire the intellective intuitions of the 
first principles. brom this one can easily see that these intuitions are 
mutually connected. The intellective intuitions are drawn by means of 
2 Quaest. Disp. De Veritate, A~. 1. 
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abstraction from the sentient intuitions and the latter is verified and 
• 
rectified by the former. For if we are to rely at all on our sense intuitions, 
we must bring them to unity by means of the principle of identity, contra-
diction and the rest; otherwise, we might take pure imagination, reverie, 
dre~, hallucinations, suggestions and auto-suggestions, madness, delirium, 
etc., for reality and truth. It is the intellect fundamentally through its 
intuitive cognition of the first principles that reduces the sense intuitions 
to unity, SimpliCity, and objective truth. In our intellective intuitions 
there is already something angelic, something divine, insofar as we thereby 
share somewhat in the angelic and divine intuitions for this is the way in 
'Wbich the angels, and especially God Himself, know themselves and things 
outside of them at once and immediately in their very essences whiCh is the 
most perfect way of cognition. Hence st. Thomas in referring to the habit of 
the first principles in man, that is, his intuitive knowledge of the first 
principlesJwritesJ 
l'Although the human soul acquires knowledge by the process 
of reasoning, still there is in ita participation in that 
simple cognition which is found in the higher substances." 3 
The bridge between the sentient intuitions and those of the intellect in 
man, there is the discursi va knowledge. In judging of the validity of the 
sense perceptions and intuitions in the light of the first principles, reason 
must be used. On the first principles the whole reason of human cognition 
must stand, else man himself will fall as he does in the modern world in the 
midst of so many contradictozy systems of philosophy. Since human knowledge 
3 De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 1. 
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is acquired only through the medium of senses and sentient perceptions, images 
.. 
and phantasies, whether it be at home, in school, in society, in the bosom of 
nature, or in the laboratory, one must constantly use reason in judging of 
everything in the light of the first principles. In all this one goes from 
the first source of truth, namely, the sentient intuitions to the last 
criterion of intellective intuitions furnished us by the habit of the first 
principles habitus primo rum principiorum the germ cells of all kJ?oWledge and 
even of the preambles of faith since we must kn.ow that God exists, that He is 
all truth, unable to be deceived~or to deceive others before we can even 
talk about the divine Revelation and consequently must verify and rectifY and 
support our rational knowledge of God by the first principles - those of 
contradiction, identity, and sufficient reason. St. Thomas declares that 
there can be no contradiction between reason and faith. "Those things which 
are kno1m by faith cannot be contrary to natural lmowledga.1I 4 In this way 
St. Thomas, unlike the moderns, does not abide in the sentient intuitions and 
does not remain in things material by a sort of sympathy thereby beconiing 
like unto them, but by mans of those intuitions he is enabled to reach the 
intellective intuitions connected with the first principles. Then in the 
light of these, by means of discursive knowledge ~nd the aid of faith, he is 
able to build a marvelous system of philosophy and theology, which he makes 
autonomous because of their different formal objects - the light of reason 
in philosophy and that of faith in the sacred theology - but never separates 
them; one of them, that is, philosophy, leads to theology and the latter helps 
4 De Ve~tate, I, Chap. 7. 
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the former and furnishes a Christian philosopher with the intuitions which 
God alone can give us. The Summa Contra Gentiles and ~ Summa Theologica 
of St. Thomas are clear proofs thereof. Some of the schoolmen seem to insist 
on the separation between philosophy and theology. They say that the field 
cif philosophy is the light of reason and that of the sacred theology the 
light of Divine Revelation. This is very true. Nevertheless if they insist 
on the separation between the two, it means that they do not understand the 
spirit of St. Thomas nor his intuitions in the domain of reason and in that 
of faith. They may be called "mechanists" in the domain of Scholasticisml 
The Lord deliver us from such schoolmen for in time they are bound to bring 
misfortunes upon us, just as the sahoolmen called "ipsedixists", who, being 
unable to meet the light and the spirit of the philosophy of St. Thomas, the 
modern era of scientific discoveries, brought disgrace on Scholasticism and 
the Catholic Church, which disgrace could not but result in untold harm not 
only to the Catholic Church but to Christianity in general. William Turner in 
his History of Philosophy writes: 
"The representatives of Scholastic philosophy in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries seem for the most part to have completely 
forgotten the principles of the classic Scholasticism of the 
fifteenth and the thirteenth centuries, busying themselves with 
subleties too refined to be grasped even by the learned, they 
utterly neglected tl~ study of the scientific movement sanctioned 
by the usage in the schools of the Golden Age of Scholasticism, 
raised the argument from authority to a position of unde impor-
tance... The decay of philosophical speculation in the schools 
and universities of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the 
humanistic movement, the repid progress of the natural sciences 
and the influence of the first reformers contributed to bring 
about the transition from Scholastic to modern philosophy." 5 
5 History of Philosophy, p. 423. 
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Our ovm. times are no less, probably much more, cri ti cal than those of 
• 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Hence we too must abandon the ways 
and by-ways of "ipsedixism" and explore the spirit and intuitions of 
st. Thomas in his vast, tremendous, most profound, as though divinely in-
spired, works, particularly his Summa Contra C~ntiles and Summa Theologica. 
Therein we shall find what the modern world precisely needs - realism 
arising from the sense intuitions, verified, rectified and supported by the 
intellective intuitions furnished us by the habit of the first principles in 
the speculative order of things by synderesis and conscience in the moral 
domain and finally by the sacred and tremendous intuitions given us by our 
holy Faith. It is only on the ground of such intuitions as these that we can 
be sure of ourselves and safe in the rest of our intuitions, those of the 
senses and the imagination. Furthermore, imbued with the spirit of St. Thomas' 
realism and guided by the principles of his manifold intuitions, we will be 
safe and sound in the midst of any human intuitions, be they those intuitions 
by which "genius reaches its fruitful creations - creations that seam to have 
been given gratuitously in a sudden illumination," or the post-rational 
intuitions, that is, the intuitions which are the fruit of analysis, 
abstraction and reasoning, in other words, the intuitions acquired by study, 
science, and investigation, or the supra-rational intuitions, that is, 
synthetic concepts of the spiritual reality in the higher order of things 
relating to God and our awn souls, free from the tyrannical immagination and 
the partial and successive views of discursive reasoning or be they 
6 finally the mystical intuitions or the vision of God in this earthly life. 
Then only will we be realists and progressivists in the true sense of the 
word. 
6 Cf. De Munnynck, M., The Thomist, "Notes on Intuition," Vol. 1, 1939, 
pp. 143-168. 
r 
i 
.. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS 
, 
Aquinas, St. Thomas, Opera Omnia, Vives Edition, Paris, 1875.·( 7th entrees). 
___ , Summa Theo1ogica • Literally translated by Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province; 2nd and rev. ed., London, 1914-1826. 
Summa Contra Gentiles. 
De Veritata. 
De Anima. 
___ J' De Virtutibus. 
___ ...J' De Magistro. 
Aristotle, MetaphYsics, Ross Edition, Clarendon Press, 1928. 
____ J. De Anima, Ross Edition, Clarendon Press, 1932 
Nichomacheon Ethics, Ross Edition" Clarendon Preas, 1390. 
Baldwin" J. M., Dictionary of PhilosophY and PsychologY, Vol. 1, 
Macmillan, liew York, 1901. 
Bandas, ~." ContemporarY Philosophy ~ Thomistic Principles, Bruce 
Publishing Co., New York, 1932. 
Baswinkla, M." ! Companion of the Theories of Knowledge in Locke and 
st. Thomas Aquinas, Chicago University Thesis, Chicago" 1940. 
Bergson, H., Illit Creative ~ Philosophy Ubrary, New York 
Bourke, Vernon J., Augustine IS Quest of 'Wisdom, Bruce Publishing Co_, 
Milwaukee, 1945. 
Brennan, Robert E., Thomistic Psychology. Macmillan Co., New York, 1937. 
97 
98 
Budy" M. W." The Theory of Imagination in Classical!ru!. Medieval Thought, 
University of lllinois" Urbana, Illinois, 19Z7. .. 
Chesterton, Gilbert K." Saint Thomas Aguinas" Sheed and Ward" New York" 1933. 
Coady, Sister Mary Anastasia" Phantasm According to §!. Thomas, Catholic 
University" WaShington, D. C., 1939. 
De Wulf" M., History 2i Medieval Philosophy, Lo~ns, Green and Co., 
New York, 1909. 
Gilson" Etienne, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Translated by 
A. H. Dawnes, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936. 
__ ~, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, Charles Scribner 1s Sons" 
New York" 1937. 
Janet, Et. Seailles" History of the Problems of Philosophy" :Macmillan, 
New York" 1902. 
Kiszely" K., Origin of Idea According to St. Augustine and St. Thomas, 
Loyola University Thesis, Chicago" 1937. 
Ladd, T., Philosophy of Knowledge, Charles Scribner's and Sons, 
New York, 19Gb. 
~ What Q!!!. I Know, (On inquiry into truth, its nature, the :meanipg of 
its attainment and its relation to the practical life.), ~gmans 
and Green Co., New York 
Ledwina, J. P., ! philosophy and Psychology of Sensation According to 
Saint Thomas, -catholic University ThesiS, Washington, D. e., 1941. 
Maritain, J., Introduction to Philosophy, English translation by Watkin 
Sheed and Ward, London, 1932. 
_______ , pegrees of Knowledge, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938. 
Phillips, D. D., ~odern Thomistic Philosophy, (2 Vols.), Burns Oates and 
Washbourne, London, 1934. 
Ross, lY. D., Aristotle, Methnen and Co., Ltd., London, 1923. 
RouBselot, P., Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, Translated by 
J. E. 01Mahoney, Sheed and Ward, New York" 1935. 
Spearman, .c. ~., The Nature of Intelligence and the Principle of Cognition, 
Macmllan, London, I927. 
99 
,~ 
Stoeckl, Albert, Handbook of the History of Philosophy, Logmans, Green 
and Co., Ngvl York. 4 
Ueberweg, Fredrick, Dr., History of Philosophy £:!:2!l!. Tales to ~ Present Time, 
Translated by Geo. S. Morris, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York,1909. 
Vauham, Life ~ Labors Qf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Albany, :New York, If?!77. 
Wild, Intuition, University Press, Cambridge, 1901. 
PERIODICAlS 
Brennan, Robert E., liThe Thomistic Concept of Immagination, If The ~ 
Scholasticism, Vol. XV, pp. 144-162, (1941). 
Carr, H., "Saint Augustine as Philosopher," Proceeding 2! the Sixth Annual 
¥eeting 2! the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 
Loyola University, Chicago, (1930), pp. 88-96. 
castiello, J., S.J., "The Psychology of Habit in st. Thomas Aquinas," 
XIV, Modern Schoolmen. pp. 8-12. 
De lJunnynck, M., "Notes on Intuition," T'ne Thomist. Vol. 1, (1939), 
pp. 144-168. 
McCormick~ J. F., S. J., "Questiones Desputate," !!!! Scholasticism. nIl 
. \1939), pp. 3f:J3-374. 
McKenzie, J. 1., S.J., "Abstraction in St. Thomas, II Modern Schoolmen, II, 
(1934), pp. 75-76. 
McKian, John D., "The Metaphysics of Introspection According to Saint Thomas," 
New Scholasticism, Vol. XV, (1941), pp. 89-110. 
Moore, T. V., O.S.B., "The Scholastic Theory of Perception," ~ Scholasticism, 
VII, (1933). 
:u.Tu11er-Thym., B. J., "The Common Sense Perfection of the Order of Pure 
Sensibility," Thomist, II, (1940), pp. 315-343. 
Rabeau, G., "Czynosc Posnania Intelektualnego Podlug Sw. Tomasza," P~lHd 
~ogicz~~ Vol. V, (1924). 
100 
Smith, G., S.J., "Intelligence and Liberty," New Scholasticism. Vol. XV, 
(19~), pp. 1-17. • 
Walsh, F. A., "Phantasm and Phantasy," ~ Scholasticism, Vol. LX, 
pp. 116-133. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES 
Sanvage, George M., "Intuition," Catholic -Encyclopedia, Vol. VII, 
pp. 82-84, The Encyclopedia Press, New York 
Wolf, Abraham, "Intuition,1f The Encyclopedia Britannica., Vol. XII, 
pp. 543-544, The Encyclopedia Britannica. Company, Ltd., London. 
r 
• 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Bernioe J. Novogrodzka. has been 
read and approved by three members of the Department of 
Philosophy_ 
The final oopies have been examined by the director of 
the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the 
fact that any neoessary ohanges have been incorpore.ted. and 
that the thesis is now given final approval with referenoe to 
oontent. form.. and meohanical accuraoy_ . 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts_ 
!~e of AdViser 
I , 
